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PUBLIC CHOICE THEORY AND THE
PRIVATE SECURITIES MARKET*
ZACHARY J. GUBLER
One of the most important developments in the capital markets
over the past decade presents a puzzle that needs to be solved.
The development is the dramatic expansion of the unregulated
market for private securities in the United States. The puzzle is
that public choice theory, the dominant theory for explaining the
behavior of the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC"),
fails to account for it. After all, the traditional public choice
account predicts that the SEC will grow its regulatory turf not
erode it. This Article develops a theory that solves this puzzle.
The argument is that the traditional public choice account
overlooks an important class of cases where regulators have
incentives to expand the unregulated portion of their industry.
With respect to the SEC, this Article argues that, by growing the
private securities market, actors at the SEC maximize support for
their current and future careers in the face of uncertainty over
how to reinvigorate a dysfunctional public market.
The theory developed in this Article has important implications
for securities regulation and beyond. With respect to securities
regulation, it suggests that any attempts to minimize the
potentially high social costs of an expanding private securities
market will need to take into account the effect of underlying
political forces. To this end, this Article sketches the outline of a
novel approach for dealing with an expanding private securities
market, the centerpiece of which is an entity (independent from
the executive branch and accountable to Congress) whose goal is
to focus greater public scrutiny on the SEC for the purpose of
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counteracting the political forces underlying the growth of that
market. This theory also has important implications for the
literature on regulatory arbitrage and optimal policy-making
more generally. In particular, it suggests that the conclusions
drawn in this literature are misleading to the extent that they
downplay or ignore the possibility that political forces may favor
regulatory arbitrage and that these same political forces may
cause regulators and lawmakers to avoid uncertainty in
policymaking altogether, just as the SEC has sought to avoid the
uncertainty associated with reform of the public securities
market.
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INTRODUCTION
In early 2011, the popular social networking site, Facebook,
raised $1.5 billion by selling its securities in a private transaction to
the investment bank Goldman Sachs.' At the time, commentators
referred to this transaction as Facebook's "private IPO" 2 because it
served many of the same functions as an initial public offering
("IPO") (including creating a stockpile of cash and a valuation for the
company's securities), and because the sheer size of the transaction
eclipsed that of almost every initial public offering of an internet
company in U.S. history.' The only difference was that the Facebook
deal took place in the private securities market, which falls outside of
the regulatory reach of the Securities and Exchange Commission
("SEC"). In recent years, these types of large private placements of
1. Press Release, Facebook, Facebook Raises $1.5 Billion (Jan. 21, 2011), available at
http://newsroom.fb.com/News/131/Facebook-Raises-1-5-Billion.
2. Albert Wenger, The Private IPO, Bus. INSIDER (Jan. 3, 2011, 8:25 AM),
http://www.businessinsider.com/the-private-ipo-2011-1; see also Larry Ribstein, What
Happened to IPOs?, TRUTH ON THE MARKET (Jan. 4, 2011, 5:15 AM),
http://truthonthemarket.com/2011/01/04/what-happened-to-ipos (noting that Facebook's
IPO sold $500 million in stock to one entity).
3. Prior to Facebook's subsequent IPO in 2012, the largest internet IPO was that of
Google, which raised about $1.7 billion in 2004. See, e.g., Benny Evangelista, Time for
Facebook to Prove Its Worth, S.F. CHRON., May 4,2012, at Al.
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securities have become increasingly common. In the same month, for
example, the coupon website Groupon raised $950 million in a
private placement.4 A few years earlier, in May 2007, Oaktree Capital
Management, LLC, a U.S. hedge fund advisory firm, raised $880
million in the private markets in what was referred to at the time as a
"groundbreaking"' transaction.6 These extraordinary transactions are
but the most visible evidence of a private, unregulated market for
securities in the United States that has expanded dramatically over
the past decade.
This expansion of the private securities market was far from
inevitable. In fact, under public choice theory, the dominant theory
explaining SEC action,' this development should not have happened
at all. Public choice theory views laws and regulations as products that
are traded in a political marketplace.' Lawmakers and bureaucrats
work to design these laws to benefit various interest groups whose
fortunes are dependent upon a favorable legal and regulatory
environment. In exchange, lawmakers receive from these interest
groups career support both in their current and future jobs.9 In
4. See Evelyn M. Rush & Andrew Ross Sorkin, Groupon I.P.O. Said to Value It at
$15 Billion, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 14, 2011, at B1.
5. William K. Sjostrom, Jr., The Birth of Rule 144A Equity Offerings, 56 UCLA L.
REV. 409, 410 (2008).
6. See Oaktree Stock Sale Completed, WALL ST. J., May 23,2007, at C2.
7. See, e.g., Donald C. Langevoort, The SEC as a Bureaucracy: Public Choice,
Institutional Rhetoric and the Process of Policy Formulation, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 527,
528 (1990) (referring to public choice as the theory that has gained the "most currency" in
explaining SEC behavior).
8. See generally FRED MCCHESNEY, MONEY FOR NOTHING: POLITICIANS, RENT
EXTRACTION, AND POLITICAL EXTORTION (1997) (explaining how political extortion
and rent extraction figure into politicians' maximization of their own welfare to the
detriment of the general public); Michael E. Levine & Jennifer L. Forrence, Regulatory
Capture, Public Interest, and the Public Agenda: Toward a Synthesis, 6 J.L. ECON. & ORG.
167 (1990) (synthesizing public interest and public choice theories into a single model);
Michael E. Levine, Why Weren't the Airlines Reregulated?, 23 YALE J. ON REG. 269 (2006)
(analyzing the effects of regulation and deregulation on the airline industry under public
choice theory); Sam Peltzman, Toward a More General Theory of Regulation, 19 J.L. &
ECON. 211 (1976) (analyzing and formalizing George Stigler's model of regulation);
Richard Posner, Theories of Economic Regulation, 5 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCi. 335
(1974) (distinguishing public choice theory from public interest and capture theories);
George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 3
(1971) (analyzing when and why industries are able to use regulations and the state for
their own purposes).
9. See Levine, supra note 8, at 273. Scholars have characterized what legislators and
regulators maximize in a number of different ways, including "power," "budget" and
political "slack." See DENNIS MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE III 360, 371, 380 (2003). This
Article uses Levine's concept of "career support" as the maxim because of both its
breadth (it takes into account goals as varied as "reelection, reappointment land] post-
regulatory employment") and its intuitive appeal. Levine, supra note 8, at 273.
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applying public choice theory to the SEC, o scholars have concluded
that many, if not most, of the regulations that the SEC adopts appear
to benefit certain groups, like securities analysts, lawyers, or large,
well-established firms, which benefit from regulatory barriers that fall
disproportionately on smaller, less well-heeled competitors." The
SEC creates these regulatory "rents" 2 for its current constituents, but
the literature also depicts the SEC as having the capacity to grow this
constituent base and the potential recipients of such rents through
bureaucratic imperialism, or attempts to increase regulatory scope by
wresting control over certain areas of financial regulation from other
agencies." The public choice literature therefore predicts that we
should see the continued growth of the public regulated securities
market and the stagnation, if not diminishment, of its private,
unregulated counterpart.14
10. SUSAN M. PHILLIPS & J. RICHARD ZECHER, THE SEC AND THE PUBLIC
INTEREST 2-4 (1981); David D. Haddock & Jonathan R. Macey, Regulation on Demand:
A Private Interest Model, with an Application to Insider Trading Regulation, 30 J.L. &
ECON. 311, 311 (1987); Gregg A. Jarrell, Change at the Exchange: The Causes and Effects
of Deregulation, 27 J.L. & ECON. 273, 273 (1984); Jonathan R. Macey, Administrative
Agency Obsolescence and Interest Group Formation: A Case Study of the SEC at Sixty, 15
CARDOZO L. REV. 909, 922 (1994); George J. Stigler, Public Regulation of Securities
Markets, 37 J. Bus. 117, 117 (1964).
11. See PHILLIPS & ZECHER, supra note 10, at 49-51 (arguing that the principal
beneficiaries of the mandatory disclosure regime are, on the one hand, lawyers who
received legal fees from preparing the required disclosure and, on the other hand,
securities analysts and others who, in the absence of mandatory disclosure rules, would
otherwise have to pay for the same information provided under the disclosure regime);
Macey, supra note 10, at 914 (arguing that established firms may actually welcome
regulation where it creates barriers to entry for smaller competitors); Stigler, supra note
10, at 124 (presenting evidence that the adoption of the securities laws had little, if any,
effect on the quality and performance of newly issued securities).
12. The term "rents" in this context refers to "returns to the owner of an asset in
excess of the level of returns necessary for him to continue using the asset in its current
employment." MCCHESNEY, supra note 8, at 10. One familiar example of rents is the
producer surplus that the producer enjoys from being able to sell goods at a market price
that is higher than the least that they are willing to sell for. This amount is represented in a
supply-demand graph by the area between the equilibrium market price and the upward
sloping supply curve. When regulators adopt regulation that favors one group of firms in
an industry over another, it increases the costs of production and therefore shifts the
supply curve up, the effect of which is an increase in producer surplus, and therefore the
rents available, for those firms that benefit from the regulation. These increased rents are
considered bad rents since society is poorer for the lost exchanges of goods for which
demanders were willing to pay the price of supply. See id. at 14-15.
13. See Macey, supra note 10, at 937-48 (presenting numerous examples of
bureaucratic imperialism at the SEC).
14. Commentators have acknowledged this public choice implication, both explicitly
and implicitly. See, e.g., ROBERTA ROMANO, FOUNDATIONS OF CORPORATE LAW 704
(2010) (acknowledging that the conclusion that the SEC is unlikely to permit the
expansion of the private securities market follows directly from public choice theory);
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Yet in reality, precisely the opposite has occurred. This Article
provides an explanation for this surprising result that carries with it
potential implications that extend beyond the context of the SEC. Its
answer is not that public choice theory is fundamentally incorrect, but
rather that the way in which it has been traditionally applied to the
SEC is incomplete. Regulators and lawmakers can pursue their own
interests, consistent with public choice theory, only if their actions are
shielded from the view of the electorate.15 In other words, regulators
and lawmakers do not simply pursue their own interests in an
unfettered world, but rather they do so subject to the constraint of
"political slack," or, in other words, the space within which regulators
are left to hand out regulatory rents to particular interest groups, free
from the scrutiny of the public."6 Most of the time, this political slack
will be significant because it is too costly for a rational electorate to
monitor regulators and lawmakers. However, this is not always the
case. For example, when issues are elevated to the public agenda, the
costs of monitoring the lawmaking process will be relatively low, as
will the political slack." Indeed, most financial legislation," including
the recent Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act
("Dodd-Frank" or the "Dodd-Frank Act")" and the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002 (the "Sarbanes-Oxley Act" or "SOX"),20 has been
enacted during just such historical moments of extreme public
scrutiny.
That the regulators' maximization problem is a constrained one
implies that, under certain conditions, regulators will in fact be willing
Donald C. Langevoort, Taming the Animal Spirits of the Stock Markets: A Behavioral
Approach to Securities Regulation, 97 Nw. U. L. REV. 135, 187 (2002) (characterizing as
"politically fanciful" a proposal under which the SEC would be required to expand the
private securities market); Donald C. Langevoort, The SEC, Retail Investors, and the
Institutionalization of the Securities Markets, 95 VA. L. REV. 1025, 1066 (2009) ("My
prediction is that the SEC would not, ultimately, be willing to leave issuer transparency in
[the private securities market] so unregulated.").
15. See Joseph P. Kalt & Mark A. Zupan, Capture and Ideology in the Economic
Theory of Politics, 74 AM. ECON. REV. 279,298 (1984); Levine, supra note 8, at 273.
16. See MUELLER, supra note 9, at 384.
17. See Levine & Forrence, supra note 8, at 191-94.
18. See Stuart Banner, What Causes New Securities Regulation? 300 Years of
Evidence, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 849, 850-51 (1997) (cataloging securities regulations that
resulted from dramatic securities market "crashes").
19. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 2, 5, 7, 12, 15, 18,
22, & 42 U.S.C.); see also infra text accompanying notes 166-89.
20. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) (codified as
amended at scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, & 29 U.S.C.); see also infra text
accompanying notes 147-71.
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to permit, or even facilitate, the expansion of the unregulated portion
of their industry if, by doing so, they are able to avoid the risk of
public scrutiny that accompanies their next best alternative regulatory
strategy. In particular, this Article finds that legislators and
bureaucrats will adopt this strategy (i) where there has been an
exogenous shock to the industry that changes the political dynamic
and creates a deregulatory environment, and (ii) where there is
considerable uncertainty about how to reverse the effects of that
exogenous shock by reforming the public, regulated market. This is
what the author believes has happened in the case of the U.S.
securities market. In particular, the much documented decade-long
decline in the market for initial public offerings21 has disrupted the
political status quo such that smaller, upstart firms that are dominated
by their larger, better-established competitors in the traditional public
choice account have greater leverage in the wake of the IPO decline.
As the smaller, upstart firms become more vocal about the stalled
IPO market and its potential for slowing American innovation and
growth, the threat of public scrutiny places pressure on the SEC to
improve access to securities market services.2 2 By expanding the
private securities market, the SEC is able to respond to the increased
demand for the services provided by a securities market23 without
risking the loss of political slack that would accompany efforts to
reform the IPO market. To be sure, the SEC could respond to this
IPO crisis and the accompanying changes in the landscape of the
political economy by simply fixing the IPO market. But that is easier
said than done, especially considering that the proximate cause of the
21. See, e.g., Darian M. Ibrahim, The New Exit in Venture Capital, 65 VAND. L. REV.
1, 2 (2012); Claire Cain Miller, Venture Investment Continues to Shrink, N.Y. TIMES (July
13, 2009,4:05 PM), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/07/13/venture-investment-continues-
to-shrink; Francesco Bova et al., The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and Exit Strategies of Private
Firms 4 (working paper, May 5, 2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers
.cfm?abstractid=1730242; PAUL KEDROSKY, RIGHT-SIZING THE U.S. VENTURE
CAPITAL INDUSTRY 4 (2009), http://www.kauffman.org/uploadedFiles
/USVentCap061009r1.pdf; DAVID WEILD & EDWARD KIM, MARKET STRUCTURE IS
CAUSING IPO CRISIS 9-14 (Grant Thornton, White Paper, June 2010),
http://www.gt.com/staticfiles//GTCom/Public%20companies%20and%20capital%20mark
ets/Files/IPO%20crisis%20-%2OJune %202010%20-%20FINAL.pdf. For example, from
1991 to 2000, the United States averaged approximately 530 IPOs per year. WEILD & KiM,
supra, at 5. Yet, since 2001, that average has dwindled to only 126, with a mere thirty-eight
IPOs in 2008 and sixty-one in 2009. Id at 3.
22. "Securities market services" refers to the capital-raising and liquidity functions
served by a securities market. See infra Part I.A.2.
23. For a brief overview of these services, see infra Part I.A.2.
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IPO market decline is clouded by uncertainty. 24 Furthermore, if the
SEC attempts to reform the IPO market and fails, it will likely attract
an enormous amount of public scrutiny, which would eliminate the
political slack that allows the SEC to pursue its own objectives of
placating interest groups and growing its bureaucratic reach.25
However, the SEC can avoid this uncertainty altogether, while still
responding to the need for increased securities market services, by
allowing or facilitating the expansion of the private securities market.
In doing so, the SEC avoids the threat to its political slack that would
accompany a failed attempt at IPO market reform.
The two securities markets-the public and the private-serve
many of the same functions (capital raising, liquidity generation, and
price creation) and therefore act as substitutes (albeit imperfect
ones). But the principal insight here is that these two markets are not
only substitutes in the market for capital, but in the political economy
as well. For this reason, if a problem in the public market (like the
recent IPO market decline) causes interest groups to demand the
SEC's intervention, the SEC can placate these interest groups not
solely by re-calibrating the regulatory dynamics of the public market
but the private market as well. Focusing regulatory efforts on the
private securities market is particularly attractive where, as in the case
of the IPO market decline, it is unclear exactly how to re-calibrate the
public market. The SEC's own behavior over the past decade is
consistent with this updated public choice theory. The SEC has been
careful not to take any action that would restrict access to the private
securities market, despite requests on several occasions to do
precisely that.26 And, in 2011, the SEC announced that it was
considering increasing access to the private securities market by
raising the shareholder threshold for triggering the reporting
requirementS27 under the Securities Exchange Act of 193428 and even
organized an advisory committee to explore this option further.29
24. See, e.g., KEDROSKY, supra note 21, at 4. For a discussion of the various theories
as to the causes of the IPO decline, see infra notes 214-17 and accompanying text.
25. See infra Part II.C.2.
26. See infra text accompanying notes 107-20.
27. See Jean Eaglesham, U.S. Eyes New Stock Rules: Regulators Move Toward
Relaxing Limits on Shareholders in Private Companies, WALL ST. J., Apr. 8, 2011, at Al
(reporting that the SEC is considering increasing from 499 the number of shareholders a
company can have without becoming a reporting company, while at the same time relaxing
the ban on general solicitations and advertising in private placements).
28. Pub. L. No. 73-291, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 78a-78pp
(West 2009 & Supp. 2012 & Pamphlet 1A Sept. 2012)).
29. See Letter from Stephen M. Graham and M. Christine Jacobs, Comm. Co-Chairs,
Advisory Comm. on Small and Emerging Cos., to Mary L. Schapiro, Chairman, SEC 3
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Contrary to the traditional public choice account, the updated
theory that this Article develops predicts that we can expect to see
the continued growth of the private securities market, at least for as
long as the IPO market remains in the doldrums. This analysis and
prediction leads to several implications. In particular, because it
excludes the public interest, the political economy forces identified
here will likely lead the SEC to expand the private securities market
beyond its optimal scope. 0 Consequently, an inefficient amount of
capital will be raised in the private securities market (where
disclosure and liquidity are relatively low), which will result in a sub-
optimal amount of disclosure and liquidity in U.S. markets. Perhaps
even more troubling, the average retail investor, who is prevented by
both legal and pragmatic constraints from directly accessing the
private securities market, will be "crowded-out" from investment
options as that market expands.
A full-blown policy proposal for dealing with these negative
implications is beyond the scope of this Article. But as an example of
how one might approach such policy reform, this Article sketches the
outlines of a first- and second-order solution to what may be the
thorniest of the three problems: the crowding-out of the retail
investor from U.S. securities markets. 32 A first-order solution to this
problem would focus on reducing the information and monitoring
costs that create political slack in the first place and lead the SEC to
shy away from IPO market reform. One solution might be to establish
a public interest watchdog group, independent from the executive and
(Mar. 9, 2012), http://www.sec.gov/info/smallbus/acsec/acsec-recommendation-02011 2 -
registration.pdf (recommending that the SEC increase the threshold requirement). In the
end, the SEC was ultimately preempted by Congress from taking this action with the
adoption of the 2012 Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106,
126 Stat. 306 (2012) (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.A. (West 2009 & Supp.
2012 & Pamphlet 1A Sept. 2012)), which increased the threshold test for determining
Exchange Act reporting applicability under section 12(g) from 500 to 2,000 shareholders
of record. See id. § 501, 126 Stat. at 325 (codified at 15 U.S.C.A. § 781(g)(1)(A) (West 2009
& Supp. 2012 & Pamphlet 1A Sept. 2012)). The Commission stated at the time that they
were not in a position to assess whether the new JOBS Act threshold was appropriate.
Letter from Mary L. Schapiro, Chairman, SEC, to U.S. Senator Tim Johnson, Chairman,
Senate Comm. on Banking, Hous., & Urban Affairs, and U.S. Senator Richard Shelby,
Ranking Member, Senate Comm. on Banking, Hous., and Urban Affairs (Mar. 13, 2012)
[hereinafter Letter to Johnson and Shelby], http://www.thecorporatecounsel.net
/nonMember/docs/jobs-SchapirotoJohnson.pdf.
30. That the political economy will lead to a sub-optimally large private securities
market assumes that policymaking in the absence of the electorate (i.e., in the presence of
slack) will lead to inefficient results. This will generally, although not always, be the case.
See, e.g., Levine, supra note 8, at 273.
31. See infra Part II1.A.3.
32. See infra Part III.B.
7532013]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
answerable to Congress, whose objective would be to increase public
scrutiny of the SEC. To that end, this panel would be expected to
monitor the SEC and translate its actions, and inactions, into a simple
periodic report that would inform the public of the impact of SEC
decision-making on the retail investor.' A second-order solution
would focus on how to provide the average retail investor with
greater access to the private securities market. This Article suggests
one approach: increasing mutual fund participation in that market by
relaxing rules that limit such funds' investment in illiquid securities.34
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I explains how the federal
securities laws create both a public (regulated) market and a private
(unregulated) one and how the private securities market has grown
dramatically over the past decade, which is a development that the
traditional public choice account of SEC decision-making fails to
predict. Part II develops an updated public choice theory that
accounts for an expanding private securities market, the central
insight of which is that an expansion of the private securities market
allows the SEC to maximize its bureaucratic support in the face of
uncertainty over how to reinvigorate a dysfunctional public securities
market. Part III considers the implications of this updated public
choice account, the central one being that the political economy
actually favors the continued expansion of the private securities
market, at least as long as the IPO market continues to languish. This
Article considers how this prediction, and the theory that underlies it,
sheds light on the law's treatment of retail investors. It also considers
the implications of this updated public choice theory beyond the SEC.
The Article ends with a brief Conclusion.
I. THE SHIFTING PUBLIC-PRIVATE DIVIDE IN U.S. SECURITIES
MARKETS
In order to understand how the traditional public choice account
of SEC behavior fails to explain the expansion of the private,
unregulated securities market, it is first necessary to understand how
the federal securities laws give rise to this unregulated market. In
addition to providing an overview of this legal landscape, this Part
also compares the public, regulated securities market to its private,
unregulated counterpart, a comparison that is integral to the updated
public choice account that is developed in Part II. Finally, this Part
concludes by setting forth the evidence supporting the primary
33. See infra text accompanying notes 265-69.
34. See infra text accompanying notes 272-77.
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observation-on which this Article is built-that over the past
decade, the private securities market has undergone a significant
expansion.
A. Overview of the Structure of this Divide
1. Legal Landscape of the U.S. Securities Market
The Securities Act of 19331s ("Securities Act") was enacted in
direct response to the market crash of 1929.36 The Securities Act "was
designed to provide investors with full disclosure of material
information concerning public offerings of securities in commerce, to
protect investors against fraud and, through the imposition of
specified civil liabilities, to promote ethical standards of honesty and
fair dealing." 37 To this end, the Securities Act adopted a registration
rule making it unlawful for any person to offer or sell a security unless
the transaction is registered with the SEC." A violation of this
registration requirement (contained in section 5 of the Securities Act
and often referred to by that section reference) gives rise to a claim of
rescission of the transaction and may justify money damages if the
"registration statement"-the disclosure that is filed with the SEC
and made publicly available through the SEC's computerized
EDGAR system-contains a material falsity or omission.3 9
This registration requirement was subsequently supplemented by
disclosure requirements in the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
("Exchange Act").' Under the Exchange Act, any securities issuer
that is subject to the registration requirement of section 5 of the
Securities Act is also obligated to make periodic disclosures under the
Exchange Act. 4 1 And even if a securities offering falls outside of the
35. Act of May 27, 1933, ch. 38, Title 1, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C.A. §§ 77a-77bbbb (West 2009 & Supp. 2012 & Pamphlet 1A Sept. 2012)).
36. H.R. REP. No. 73-85, at 2-3 (1933) (stating the reasons for passage of the
Securities Act).
37. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185,195 (1976) (citing H.R. REP. NO. 73-85,
at 1-5).
38. Act of May 27, 1933, ch. 38, Title I, § 5, 48 Stat. at 77 (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C.A. § 77e (West 2009 & Supp. 2012 & Pamphlet 1A Sept. 2012)).
39. THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION §§ 7.2-7.3 (5th ed.
2005). The provisions that give rise to the rescission and damages remedies are contained
in sections 12(a)(1) and (11), respectively, of the Securities Act. See 15 U.S.C.
§§ 771(a)(1), 77k (2006).
40. Pub. L. No. 73-291, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 78a-78pp
and scattered statutes of 15 U.S.C.A. § 77 (West 2009 & Supp. 2012 & Pamphlet 1A Sept.
2012)).
41. 15 U.S.C. § 78o(d) (2006).
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purview of section 5, an issuer might nevertheless be swept into the
Exchange Act's disclosure regime if the issuer is deemed significant
enough, as measured by the size of its shareholder base.42
These registration and disclosure requirements effectively create
a public securities market in the United States, accessible by virtually
anyone with a stockbroker or, in a web-based world, an online
brokerage account. But just as the federal securities law regime
creates a public securities market, it also creates a private one. This is
because section 4(2) of the Securities Act says that section 5's
registration requirement does not apply to "transactions by an issuer
not involving any public offering." 4  This provision has generated a
complicated line of case law," including a watershed United States
Supreme Court opinion,45 but the distinction between private and
public offerings nevertheless remains murky. For this reason, the SEC
has created regulatory safe harbors that, if complied with, ensure that
a given transaction will fall within the exemption for private
offerings.46 For offerings of any economic significance,' the most
commonly relied-upon safe harbor is Rule 506 of Regulation D.48
This rule exempts an issuer from section 5's registration requirement
if the issuer, among other things, limits the offering principally49 to
"accredited investors"5 0  (which is a measure of investor
42. Section 12(g) of the Exchange Act, as recently amended by the JOBS Act,
requires a company to register its securities under the Exchange Act if it has $10 million or
more in total assets and a class of equity securities "held of record" by 500 or more
persons who are not "accredited investors" or 2000 or more persons generally. 15
U.S.C.A. § 781(g)(1)(A) (West 2009 & Supp. 2012 & Pamphlet 1A Sept. 2012).
43. Id. § 77d(a)(2).
44. See, e.g., JAMES D. COX ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION 271-73 (2009)
(analyzing a line of Fifth Circuit cases dealing with the underlying issues of the private
placement exemption).
45. See SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 124-27 (1953) (holding that whether
an offering of securities is exempt from section 5 of the Securities Act as a private
placement turns on the extent to which the offerees both have access to the type of
information that would be included in a registration statement and are capable of "fending
for themselves" with respect to investing).
46. See HAZEN,supra note 39, §§ 4.20-4.22.
47. Rules 504 and 505 of Regulation D also provide exemptions from section 5;
however, these provisions are limited to relatively small offerings ($1 million and $5
million, respectively). See 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.504(b)(2), 230.505(b)(2)(i) (2012).
48. Id. § 230.506.
49. It is permissible to include some non-accredited investors in the offering as long as
the issuer "reasonably believes" that such investors number no greater than thirty-five. See
id. § 230.505(b)(2)(ii).
50. The definition of "accredited investor" includes (i) institutional investors such as
banks, insurance companies, and mutual funds; (ii) individual investors with net worths in
excess of $1 million, annual incomes in excess of $200,000, or joint annual incomes in
excess of $300,000; and (iii) executive officers and directors of the issuer. See id. § 230.215.
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sophistication) and avoids a "general solicitation."" Moreover, the
issuer must take reasonable steps to prevent resales of the securities
from violating the section 5 registration requirement.s2 As long as an
issuer satisfies these conditions, the offering is deemed a private one
and is exempt from the strictures of the Securities Act.5 3 In addition,
provided the issuer maintains the size of its shareholder base below
the regulatory maximum for purposes of the disclosure
requirement-which was recently increased from 500 to 2,0005 4 -it
also escapes the disclosure requirements of the Exchange Act.5
2. Practical Landscape: The Private Securities Market as a
Substitute for the Public Market
The private securities markets6  serves many of the same
functions as its public counterpart and therefore can be thought of as
a substitute (albeit an imperfect one) for the public securities market.
The argument made in Part II is that these markets are substitutes not
just for business purposes but for political purposes as well. In other
words, the substitutability of the private and public markets is integral
to the updated public choice account that is developed in Part II and
therefore merits some discussion here. The substitutability of these
two markets is best illustrated by comparing them along three
dimensions: capital raising, capital liquidity, and market price
51. Id. §§ 230.502(c), 230.506(b)(1). Under the SEC's own interpretation of the
"general solicitation" provision, a Rule 506 offering must be limited to those with whom
the issuer or someone acting on its behalf has a preexisting, substantive relationship. See
William K. Sjostrom, Jr., Relaxing the Ban: It's Time To Allow General Solicitation and
Advertising in Exempt Offering, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1,13-14 (2004).
52. Although resales are generally exempt from section 5, a purchaser may run afoul
of the registration requirement if it resells the security within too short a period of time
after the initial purchase and is thereby deemed an underwriter under section 2(a)(11) of
the Securities Act. See 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(11) (2006) (defining the term "underwriter,"
among other things, as "any person who has purchased from an issuer with a view
to... the distribution of any security"); id. § 77d(a)(1) (stating that transactions
undertaken by "underwriters" are not exempt from section 5's registration requirements).
Under SEC interpretation, anyone who sells restricted (or unregistered) securities is
presumed to be an underwriter unless the sale is made in compliance with the regulatory
safe harbor contained in Securities Act Rule 144. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.144(b) (2012).
53. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(a) (2012).
54. See JOBS Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 501, 126 Stat. 306, 325 (2012) (codified at 15
U.S.C.A. § 781(g)(1)(A) (West 2009 & Supp. 2012 & Pamphlet 1A Sept. 2012)).
55. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
56. This Article is interested in the market consisting of securities of companies that
are not subject to the reporting requirements of the Exchange Act. By "private company"
or "private securities market," this Article means a non-reporting company or the market
consisting of those companies.
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efficiency. These three functions are referred to in this Article as
"securities market services."
a. Cash Infusions for Aggressive Growth
A major benefit of entering a securities market is that it provides
a source of capital for companies that need a cash infusion in order to
grow their businesses, whether organically or through acquisitions."
A securities market links up those who demand capital (the firms)
with those who are willing to provide such capital (the investors).
Both the public and private securities markets perform this same
function. To be sure, differences exist between the two markets. But
with respect to capital infusion, the size of the securities offering that
the relevant market can bear is becoming less of a distinguishing
characteristic. While the public market is obviously bigger and
therefore can support larger offerings, the private securities market is
no longer inaccessible for offerings of significance. Companies make
private offerings that raise several hundreds of millions of dollars,58
and it appears that the market has now reached the billion-dollar
neighborhood with the offerings of Facebook, which raised $1.5
billion, and Groupon, which raised $950 million.59 Rather, the main
difference between the two markets is simply in the composition of
the investors who participate in them. Whereas the private securities
market consists principally of sophisticated investors, 0 the public
markets have an array of investors from diverse backgrounds, both
sophisticated and unsophisticated.
b. Liquidity for Investor Exit
When a company makes a securities offering, it participates in a
market in which those securities can be traded freely.6' This market
liquidity is crucial because it allows company insiders who have been
issued securities as part of their compensation, from the CEO to the
rank-and-file employees, to sell those securities for cash. Liquidity is
57. See, e.g., Sjostrom, supra note 5, at 432.
58. See infra note 94 and accompanying text.
59. See Press Release, Facebook, supra note 1; Rush & Sorkin, supra note 4.
60. Most offerings in the private market will be carried out pursuant to Rule 506 of
Regulation D, which limits the offering to "accredited investors," or possibly Rule 144A,
which limits the offering to qualified institutional buyers. See supra notes 35-55 and
accompanying text. While non-sophisticated investors may end up with these private
securities through resales under Rule 144, see infra notes 66-69 and accompanying text, as
a practical matter, resales are made to investors who would also be considered
"sophisticated."
61. See, e.g., Sjostrom, supra note 5, at 432.
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of particular importance for the venture capitalists who initially
bankroll the pre-offering company because it provides them a much-
needed opportunity to exit from their investment. Without an exit
opportunity, venture capitalists would be reluctant to provide capital
in the first place, and the company would have a difficult time
obtaining funding. Thus, the liquidity function of securities markets
plays a crucial role in creating a venture capital market and thereby in
enabling innovation.62
The private securities market contains two features that make it
less liquid than its public counterpart, one legal and the other
structural. The legal impediment is that, unlike in the public market
where securities are traded freely, securities traded in the private
market are "restricted securities," meaning that they are subject to
constraints on their transferability.6 Under section 5 of the Securities
Act, not just the issuer's initial sale, but every sale of securities must
be registered with the SEC or otherwise benefit from a statutory
exemption.' For resales of securities, the relevant statutory
exemption is section 4(1), which exempts from registration
"transactions by any person other than an issuer, underwriter, or
dealer."'5 For a resale, the most significant hurdle in applying this
exemption is the term "underwriter," which the Securities Act defines
very broadly to mean, among other things, "any person who has
purchased from an issuer with a view to ... the distribution of any
security.""
Because of the uncertainty surrounding this definition, parties
will typically rely on one of two resale exemptions promulgated by
the SEC: Rule 144 or Rule 144A. Which of these two exemptions
applies depends on the type of buyer purchasing the securities at issue
and the amount of time that the seller has held those securities. Rule
144 applies to any buyer but only applies to restricted securities the
seller has held for at least one year.' Thus, it does not allow security
holders of private companies to resell immediately, or even in the
62. See Bernard Black & Ronald Gilson, Venture Capital and the Structure of Capital
Markets: Banks Versus Stock Markets, 47 J. FIN. ECON. 243, 245 (1998).
63. Under Rule 144, "restricted securities" includes securities acquired from an issuer
in a non-public offering. 17 C.F.R. § 230.144(a)(3)(i) (2012).
64. See Sjostrom, supra note 5, at 418.
65. 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(1) (2006).
66. Id. § 77b(a)(11).
67. 17 C.F.R. § 230.144(d)(1)(ii). This holding period is only six months for exempt
resales of companies that are reporting companies under the Exchange Act. Id.
§ 230.144(d)(1)(i). However, this Article is primarily concerned with the market for
securities of non-reporting companies. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
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near term. By contrast, there is no holding requirement under Rule
144A. Rather, Rule 144A creates a limitation on buyers, requiring
that restricted securities be offered and sold only to "qualified
institutional buyers" ("QIBs"), 8 which include institutions that own
and invest on a discretionary basis at least $100 million in the
securities of entities other than affiliates.' In other words, Rule 144A
only applies to purchasers of restricted securities that (a) are
relatively large investment funds and (b) trade in securities of entities
that do not have a control relationship with the fund. Thus, while the
private securities market provides firms with liquidity, the law
surrounding resale of restricted securities make these securities less
freely tradable than securities in the public market.
In addition to legal constraints on liquidity, the private securities
market also exhibits a structural constraint, in that it has traditionally
lacked the benefit of developed exchanges, such as the New York
Stock Exchange ("NYSE") or the NASDAQ. Stock exchanges are
important as both organizers of markets and generators of
information.' As a market organizer, stock exchanges connect those
who demand capital with those who supply capital." As an
information generator, stock exchanges allow parties to keep track of
historical stock prices while at the same time providing ready access
to current prices.72 A stock market without stock exchanges is like the
mortgage market prior to the Internet. To be sure, there was a market
for mortgages prior to the Internet. But the market was far from
efficient. The potential homeowner did not necessarily know the
identities of even a small fraction of the total universe of mortgage
lenders, and she did not know the prices, either historical or current,
of those mortgage producs. But with the advent of the Internet, and
sites like Lending Tree and Google Mortgages, the potential
homeowner has access to an almost dizzying array of mortgage
lenders and price information. 3
In recent years, the private stock market has undergone a similar
change with the emergence of private stock exchanges that perform
many of the same functions as the NYSE or NASDAQ. These stock
68. 17 C.F.R. § 230.144A(d)(1).
69. Id. § 230.144A(a)(1)(i).
70. See Andreas M. Fleckner, Stock Exchanges at the Crossroads, 74 FORDHAM L.
REv. 2541, 2546-47 (2006).
71. See id. at 2546.
72. See id. at 2547.
73. See, e.g., Tom Brown & Lacey Plache, Paying with Plastic: Maybe Not So Crazy,
73 U. CHI. L. REv. 63, 73-74 (2006) (discussing how technological changes, including the
Internet, have transformed consumer lending).
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exchanges are populated largely with entrepreneurs and private
company employees who want to sell the common stock they receive
in consideration for their services to their companies.14 Venture
capitalists are playing an increasingly prominent role on these
exchanges, as the exchanges provide a potentially "new exit" from the
preferred stock that they received in exchange for their investment in
the company." And there are reports that these exchanges are
preparing to accommodate not only secondary market trading-or, in
other words, resales of previously issued securities-but primary
market trading as well, thereby providing a means by which private
companies will actually be able to make initial "private" offerings of
securities through the use of these private exchanges. 6 These
developments will only make the private securities market more
liquid, making it a closer substitute for the public market.
c. A Market Price for Purposes of Governance, Compensation
and Acquisition
Not only does a new market for securities create liquidity, but it
also establishes a market price.n This is important for purposes of
governance, compensation, and acquisition. With respect to
governance, a market price provides management with feedback on
how well it is running the company so as to maximize shareholder
value.78 As a measure of the value that shareholders place on the
company, the market price also allows the board of directors to make
use of performance-based compensation,7 9 either by using the
company's stock itself as a form of compensation or through the use
of "phantom stock," which is a compensation scheme that mimics the
payoffs of a particular security without requiring the actual transfer of
74. See Ibrahim, supra note 21, at 117-18.
75. See id.
76. Jay Yarow, Are We Headed for Disaster with Private Stock Markets? We Talk to
SharesPost CEO David Weir, Bus. INSIDER (Mar. 22, 2011, 5:27 PM),
http://www.businessinsider.com/sharespost-interview-2011- 3 .
77. See, e.g., Sjostrom, supra note 5, at 433.
78. See generally Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Rise of Independent Directors in the United
States, 1950-2005: Of Shareholder Value and Stock Market Prices, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1465
(2007) (discussing how increased stock market liquidity and increased informativeness of
stock prices bolstered the historical shift to a shareholder maximization standard in
corporate governance).
79. See generally LUCIAN A. BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT
PERFORMANCE (2004) (offering a critical analysis of current executive compensation
practices and offering solutions for tying these practices more closely to performance).
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that security." Finally, a market price provides the company with a
currency-its own securities-with which it can pursue acquisitions to
grow the company."
Because the accuracy of a market price depends heavily on
market liquidity, analysis of the private securities market's
substitutability for its public counterpart along this "market price
dimension" mirrors the one conducted above for market liquidity.
Thus, as in the discussion of market liquidity, the most important
variable in evaluating how good the private securities market is at
establishing a market price is private securities exchanges.82 As these
exchanges become more prevalent and better established, the private
securities market becomes an increasingly closer substitute for its
public counterpart.
This brief overview demonstrates that although the private
securities market is not a perfect substitute for the public market, it is
increasingly becoming a closer one. Through the Rule 144A equity
offering, the selling company can sell stock to QIBs without the
transferability constraints that apply to other unregistered securities.
And all restricted securities (provided that they have "come to rest" 3
if not Rule 144A securities) have become easier to transfer with the
rise of private securities exchanges.
But even this brief comparison of the substitutability of these two
markets would be incomplete if it ignored the costs that companies
avoid by selling securities in the private instead of the public
market.8 These costs fall into two main groups: compliance costs and
liability costs. When a company sells securities in the public market, it
must prepare and file annual, quarterly, and current reports under the
Exchange Act." This compliance task requires companies to hire
expensive lawyers and accountants, in addition to company
80. DAVID L. ScoTT, WALL STREET WORDS 274 (3d. ed. 2003) (defining the term
"phantom stock plan"); see also Sjostrom, supra note 5, at 434 (discussing phantom stock
as a form of compensation),
81. See, e.g., Sjostrom, supra note 5, at 433.
82. See supra notes 61-76 and accompanying text.
83. This term refers to the requirement that a purchaser hold its restricted securities
for a certain period of time before reselling them in order to avoid being deemed an
"underwriter" under section 4(1) of the Securities Act. See Rutheford B. Campbell, Jr.,
Resales of Securities Under the Securities Act of 1933, 52 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1333, 1352(1995). Under the Rule 144 safe harbor, the securities holder can satisfy this requirement
if, among other things, he holds the securities for one year (or six months if the issuer is
currently a reporting company and has been one for at least ninety days). 17 C.F.R.
§ 230.144(d)(1)(i)-(ii) (2012).
84. See, e.g., Sjostrom, supra note 5, at 435-41.
85. See HAZEN, supra note 39, § 9.
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employees that must spend part or all of their time on compliance
issues. 6 All of this manpower represents real costs, which only
increased with the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.' In addition to
compliance costs, a company selling securities in the public market
also exposes its officers and directors to potential civil and criminal
liability that is not present in the private market. This liability risk
stems from a number of rules, including prohibitions on (i)
misstatements, omissions, or misleading information included in any
one of a variety of public SEC filings;" (ii) deficiencies in the
company's internal controls; and (iii) trading in the company's stock
on the basis of material, nonpublic information89 or within six months
of a previous trade. 90
Thus, from the perspective of the company in need of additional
capital, the contemporary private securities market in the United
States bears an increasingly close resemblance to the public securities
market with respect to these securities market services. At the same
time, the private securities market lacks the compliance and liability
costs of its public counterpart. It therefore follows from these facts
that, as a theoretical matter, companies should be increasingly
inclined to choose the private securities market over the public
alternative for securities market services, leading to an expansion of
the private securities market. What is particularly surprising is that
the SEC has allowed, if not encouraged, this expansion to take place.
86. See Thomas E. Hartman, The Continued Costs of Being a Public Company, THE
CORPORATE BOARD, Nov./Dec. 2007, at 14, http://www.foley.com/files/Publication
/2bcla4ca-f838-4199-bda2-2075ac886724/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/59583483-
7683-4d22-9080-265167fb4fec/CostPublicHartman.pdf.
87. See, e.g., William J. Carney, The Costs of Being Public After Sarbanes-Oxley: The
Irony of "Going Private," 55 EMORY L.J. 141, 150 (2006) (reporting that, among
companies converting from public to private in 2004, average compliance costs doubled as
a result of SOX); Ellen Engel et al., The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and Firms' Going-Private
Decisions, 44 J. ACCT. & ECON. 116, 116 (2007) (finding that firms went private in
increasing numbers following passage of SOX); Kate Litvak, The Effect of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act on Non-US Companies Cross-Listed in the US, 13 J. CORP. FIN. 195, 195 (2007)
(finding that foreign firms that cross-list in the United States and are subject to SOX
experienced a significant decrease in stock price following passage of the legislation as
compared to foreign cross-listed firms that are not subject to SOX); Ivy Xiying Zhang,
Economic Consequences of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 44 J. Accr. & ECON. 74, 74
(2007) (finding that the U.S. stock market reacted overwhelmingly negatively to the
passage of SOX).
88. See HAZEN, supra note 39, §§ 7.3, 7.6.
89. See id. § 12.17.
90. See id. § 13.2.
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B. The Expanding Private Securities Market
All available evidence suggests that the private securities market
has undergone a dramatic expansion in recent years. Surprisingly, the
SEC has not merely permitted this expansion, but it has taken steps
to facilitate it as well. The evidence of an expanding private securities
market is both anecdotal and formal. Anecdotally, we have seen the
recent emergence of private offerings that were simply unheard of a
decade ago. Traditionally, the private securities market lacked both
the depth and breadth to act as a viable alternative to its public
counterpart with respect to capital raising, share liquidity, and market
price efficiency-the securities market services discussed previously.91
However, in recent years, that conventional wisdom has been turned
on its head with private placements of a size and complexity that were
virtually unknown until recently. These transactions include private
offerings conducted by Facebook, Groupon, 92 Oaktree Capital
Management, LLC,93 and many others.94 The emergence of private
exchanges, which enable this onslaught of private securities market
activity, is itself evidence of a market that is experiencing dramatic
growth.95
In addition to this anecdotal evidence, there is also more formal
evidence of an expanding private securities market. Between 1991
and 1995, venture capitalists funneled approximately $28 billion into
start-up companies, investments that resulted in about 2,600 IPOs
over that period.' By contrast, since the end of the dot-coin bubble in
2000, venture capital funds have invested over $208 billion into start-
up companies, and yet less than 1,100 of those investments have led to
IPOs.97 Thus, although venture capitalists have raised almost ten
91. See, e.g., William K. Sjostrom, Jr., Carving a New Path to Equity Capital and Share
Liquidity, 50 B.C. L. REv. 639, 649-55 (2009) (explaining that the disadvantages of a
company's decision to remain private consist primarily of "constraints on capital raising
and share illiquidity").
92. See Press Release, Facebook, supra note 1; Rush & Sorkin, supra note 4.
93. See Oaktree Stock Sale Completed, supra note 6.
94. Between 2002 and 2007, there were roughly eighty-three private placements that
were structured as Rule 144A offerings. See Jack Gage, Don't Peek, FORBES (Jan. 7, 2008
12:00 AM), http://www.forbes.com/forbes/2008/0107/032.html. These transactions raised
on average $282 million in capital. Id. Nonetheless, as Professor Sjostrom first noted, the
size of Oaktree's Rule 144A offering marked a turning point in this market. See Sjostrom,
supra note 5, at 412 ("[U]p until the announcement of the Oaktree deal, a Rule 144A
equity offering was unheard of as an IPO alternative for a U.S. company.").
95. See supra notes 72-76 and accompanying text (describing the emergence of the
private securities exchanges).
96. See WEILD & KIM, supra note 21, at 4, 6.
97. See id. at 4.
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times the amount of money over the past decade that they raised in
the four-year period prior to the dot-com bubble, the number of IPOs
conducted during this decade is only half of what it was during the
earlier period. The venture-capital backed firms are simply staying
private for longer. Consistent with this observation is the fact that the
number of public corporations in the United States in 2009 was half of
what it had been in 1997.8 In fact, this number declined by over
twenty-one percent just between 2008 and 2009."1 Finally, the
expanding private securities market is being fed by domestic and
foreign companies. For example, data suggest that between 2005 and
2007 alone the amount of equity raised by foreign issuers in the
private securities market in the United States, as a percentage of
equity raised in the public market, increased more than threefold."
The fact that the private securities market has undergone a rapid
expansion in recent years is in itself evidence that the SEC has
permitted this expansion to occur. After all, the SEC could at any
juncture have adopted regulations to slow this growth. Furthermore,
there is evidence not just that the SEC has permitted the expansion of
the private securities market but that it has actively facilitated its
growth. Indeed, in response to a letter to Republican Congressman
Darrell Issa, SEC Chairman Mary Schapiro acknowledged the
Agency's role in facilitating the expansion of the private securities
market.o'0 Perhaps the most obvious examples of this facilitation are
the steps the SEC has taken over the past fifteen years to make it
easier to resell restricted securities under Rule 144. Recall that
securities purchased in the private market are "restricted" and cannot
be resold, unless the seller either follows the elaborate procedures set
forth in section 5 or, more likely, avails herself of an exemption. 102
The most common exemption, Rule 144, permits the resale of
98. Gerald F. Davis, The Twilight of the Berle and Means Corporation, 34 SEATTLE U.
L. REV. 1121, 1134 (2011).
99. See id.
100. Press Release, Comm. on Capital Mkts. Regulation, Committee on Capital
Markets Regulation Completes Survey Regarding the Use by Foreign Issuers of Private
Rule 144a Equity Market (Feb. 13, 2009), available at
http://capmktsreg.org/2009/02/committee-on-capital-markets-regulation-completes-survey-
regarding-the-use-by-foreign-issuers-of-the-private-rule-144a-equity-market/ ("In the
period from 2000 to 2005, we estimate that foreign issuers raised on average 6.8% as much
equity via Rule 144A ADRs as they raised in the U.S. public market. After spiking to
80.8% in 2006, the ratio declined to 24.0% in 2007.").
101. Letter from Mary Schapiro, SEC Chairman, to U.S. Congressman Darrell Issa,
Chairman, Comm. on Gov't Oversight and Reform (Apr. 6, 2011),
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/schapiro-issa-letter-040611.pdf.
102. See supra notes 62-66 and accompanying text.
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restricted securities by anyone other than the issuer, provided that the
seller has held the securities for at least one year prior to resale.10
Although this current incarnation of Rule 144 places meaningful
constraints on resales of restricted securities, it is the least restrictive
version of the Rule that has existed since the Rule's adoption in 1972.
Over the past fifteen years, the SEC has reduced Rule 144's holding
period twice: first, in 1997, from three years to two," and second, in
2007, from two years to one.' 5 By restricting Rule 144's holding
period, the SEC increased the liquidity of restricted securities and
therefore made it more attractive to raise capital in the private
securities market.
Furthermore, the SEC has resisted calls to make it more difficult
for companies to escape the public market for the refuge of the
private one. Recall that under section 12(g) of the Exchange Act, a
company must register its securities and comply with the Act's
disclosure requirements if it has $10 million or more in total assets1
and a class of equity securities "held of record" by the threshold
number of shareholders. 10 Thus, if a public company has any desire
to escape the scrutiny of the public market and seek refuge in the
private one (a process referred to as "going dark"), it faces what
appears to be a significant hurdle in having to make sure that it has
fewer than that threshold number of security holders. However, it
turns out that this hurdle is much less onerous than it first appears,
because the SEC has interpreted the term "held of record" in section
12(g) narrowly to mean only those shareholders listed on the
corporate records.'o This interpretation is particularly narrow
because the vast majority of shareholders of public companies are not
shareholders listed on the corporate records. 09 Rather, they are
103. See supra notes 67-69 and accompanying text.
104. See Revision of Holding Period Requirements in Rules 144 and 145, 62 Fed. Reg.
9,242, 9,242 (Feb. 28, 1997) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 230).
105. See Revisions to Rule 144 and Rule 145 to Shorten Holding Period for Affiliates
and Non-Affiliates, 72 Fed. Reg. 36,822, 36,844 (July 5, 2007) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts
230, 239).
106. 17 C.F.R. § 240.12g-4(a)(1)(ii) (2012). Although section 12(g)(1) provides for a
total asset threshold of $1 million, the SEC has exempted companies from registration
under section 12(g) if their total assets do not exceed $10 million. See id. § 240.12g-1.
107. The current shareholder threshold, as set out in the JOBS Act, is 500 or more
persons who are not "accredited investors" or 2,000 or more persons generally. 15
U.S.C.A. § 781(g)(1)(A) (West 2009 & Supp. 2012 & Pamphlet 1A Sept. 2012). Prior to the
JOBS Act, the applicable threshold was 500 security holders. Law of Aug. 20, 1964, Pub.
L. No. 88-467, § 3(c), 78 Stat. 565, 566-67.
108. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.12g5-1(a) (2012).
109. See Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, The Hanging Chads of Corporate Voting, 96
GEO. L. J. 1227, 1236-40 (2008).
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shareholders who hold their stock in what is referred to as a "street
name," meaning that it is held through custodians such as banks and
brokerage firms who themselves hold the shares through accounts at
a depository company called, predictably, the Depository Trust
Company ("DTC").1 o It is the DTC, not the "beneficial owner" of
the stock, listed as the registered holder in the corporate records."'
This custodial holding structure obviates the need for individuals to
actually hold physical stock certificates and therefore is essential to
the efficient settlement and clearing of the modern securities
industry.1 12 But it also means that under SEC rules, a company could
theoretically have thousands of shareholders and yet still qualify to
leave the public markets and "go dark" because it counts fewer than
500 shareholders listed on the corporate records.n"I
Beginning in 2003, investors have repeatedly petitioned the SEC
to adopt a broader definition of the term "held of record," as the
statute permits.114 Under these investors' proposals,115 the SEC would
interpret that term to include any "beneficial owners" of stock held in
street name. The "beneficial owner" standard would effectively look
through the custodial holding structure of DTC and count as "holders
of record" those shareholders who have the right to exercise control
over a given security. 116 Thus, under this proposed "beneficial owner"
test, the hypothetical company with thousands of shareholders but
fewer than 500 on the corporate record books would be qualified to
go dark. Nevertheless, the SEC has repeatedly declined this invitation
to broaden the definition of the "held of record" language, and in so
110. Id.
111. See id.
112. See id. at 1236-37.
113. See, e.g., Jesse M. Fried, Firms Gone Dark, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 135, 140 (2009).
114. The statute allows the SEC to define the terms "total assets" and "held of record."
See JOBS Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 502, 126 Stat. 306, 326 (2012) (codified at 15
U.S.C.A. § 781(g)(5) (West 2009 & Supp. 2012 & Pamphlet 1A Sept. 2012)). As the
codifications section of the 2012 Supplement Pamphlet describes, section 502 of the JOBS
Act, the section of the public law making this change to subparagraph (A) of section
12(g)(5), "was incapable of execution, since there is no subpar. (A) in subsec. (g)(5)." The
cite to the U.S.C.A. is preserved for consistancy's sake pending resolution of this matter.
115. See, e.g., Letter from Anthony Chiarenza to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec'y, SEC
(Apr. 1, 2009), http://www.sec.gov/rules/petitions/4-483/4483-27.pdf; Letter from Lawrence
J. Goldstein to Mary L. Schapiro, Chairman, SEC (Mar. 26, 2009),
http://www.sec.gov/rules/petitions/4-483/4483-24.pdf; Petition from Stephen J. Nelson to
Jonathan Katz, Sec'y, SEC, (July 3, 2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules
/petitions/petn4-483.htm.
116. The SEC defines a "beneficial owner" of a security to include anyone who
exercises voting or investment power with respect to a security. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-3
(2012).
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doing, has refused to narrow the scope of the private securities
market."' Finally, in 2011, the SEC announced that it was considering
increasing access to the private securities market by raising the
shareholder threshold for triggering the Exchange Act's reporting
requirements."' To that end, the SEC organized an advisory
committee that ended up recommending an increase in the threshold
test,"' but the SEC was ultimately preempted by Congress from
taking this action with the adoption of the 2012 JOBS Act, which
increased the threshold test for determining section 12(g) Exchange
Act reporting applicability from 500 to 2,000 record shareholders.120
Thus, not only has the SEC allowed the private securities market
to expand dramatically, taking a laissez-faire attitude to the market in
general and the private securities exchanges in particular, but it has
undertaken affirmative actions, and considered others (before being
preempted by congressional action) that expanded or would have
expanded the private securities market. The question is: Why? This
question becomes all the more puzzling when considered in light of
public choice theory's prediction of how the Commission will act.
II. PUBLIC CHOICE THEORY AND THE PRIVATE SECURITIES
MARKET
A. The Traditional Public Choice Account of the SEC: Regulatory
Rent Creation and the Expanding Regulatory Scope
Public choice theory aims to explain legislative and regulatory
outcomes by applying the rational actor model of economics to the
117. Notably, in February 2011, the Division of Corporation Finance met with a
number of investors, including the author of the original petition for the beneficial
ownership interpretation, perhaps in reaction to the Facebook transaction. Memorandum
from Steven Hearne, Special Counsel, Div. of Corp. Fin. of the SEC (Feb. 10, 2011),
http://www.sec.gov/rules/petitions/4-483/4483-29.pdf.
118. See Eaglesham, supra note 27 (reporting that the Commission is considering
increasing from 499 the number of shareholders a company can have without becoming a
reporting company while at the same time relaxing the ban on general solicitations and
advertising in private placements).
119. Letter from Stephen M. Graham and M. Christine Jacobs, Comm. Co-Chairs,
Advisory Comm. on Small and Emerging Cos., to Mary L. Schapiro, Chairman, SEC 3
(Mar. 9, 2012), http://www.sec.gov/infolsmalibus/acsec/acsec-recommendation-020112-
registration.pdf.
120. See JOBS Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 501, 126 Stat. 306, 325 (2012) (codified in 15
U.S.C.A. § 781(g)(1)(A) (West 2009 & Supp. 2012 & Pamphlet 1A Sept. 2012)). The
Commission stated at the time that they were not in a position to assess whether the new
JOBS Act threshold was appropriate. Letter to Johnson and Shelby, supra note 29.
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lawmaking process.12 1 The theory conceives of this process as a
market for legal rules.12 2 The suppliers of these legal rules are
lawmakers (legislators and regulators), and the consumers are the
group likely to be affected by the lawmaking in question.123
Lawmakers supply legal rules in exchange for a currency, which is
often stylized as career support. 12 4 This career support may take a
variety of forms, including help in achieving reelection,
reappointment or post-regulatory employment,' 1 or simply continued
relevance.126
Thus, public choice theory views legal rules as the reflection of a
political bargain struck between lawmakers and various interested
groups. Public choice theory has been used to explain a variety of
different types of regulatory action 27 in many contexts.12 8 But
beginning with George Stigler's Nobel Prize-winning work in the late
1960s-1970s,29 public choice theory has been closely associated, in
particular, with the SEC.13 0 Under this traditional account, the SEC is
beholden to certain small, cohesive groups that benefit from
121. See, e.g., MUELLER, supra note 9, at 1 ("Public choice can be defined as the
economic study of nonmarket decision making, or simply the application of economics to
political science. The subject matter of public choice is the same as that of political science:
the theory of the state, voting rules, voting behavior, party politics, the bureaucracy, and
so on. The methodology of public choice is that of economics, however.").
122. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
123. See supra notes 8-13 and accompanying text.
124. See, e.g., Levine, supra note 8, at 273.
125. Levine, supra note 8, at 273.
126. See Macey, supra note 10, at 914 ("[A]n agency that has been rendered obsolete
by exogenous changes in the form of technological development or new marketplace
developments will find that it must provide favors to discrete constituencies in order to
preserve some measure of support for its continued existence.").
127. See, e.g., MCCHESNEY, supra note 8, at 22-23, 61 (regulatory forbearance);
Haddock & Macey, supra note 10, at 312 (regulatory action); Jarrell, supra note 10, at 273
(reversal of regulatory action).
128. See generally ROBERT E. BALDWIN, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF U.S. IMPORT
POLICY (1985) (trade policy); Nathaniel Beck, Elections and the Fed: Is There a Political
Monetary Cycle?, 31 AM. J. POL. SCI. 194 (1987) (monetary policy); Richard S. Higgins &
Fred McChesney, Truth and Consequences: The Federal Trade Commission's Ad
Substantiation Program, 6 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 151 (1986) (the FTC); Levine, supra
note 8 (airline regulation); Jonathan R. Macey, Federal Deference to Local Regulators and
the Economic Theory of Regulation: Toward a Public-Choice Explanation of Federalism,
76 VA. L. REv. 265 (1990) (federalism) [hereinafter Macey, Federal Deference]; Jonathan
R. Macey, Judicial Preferences, Public Choice, and the Rules of Procedure, 23 J. LEGAL
STUD. 627 (1994) (civil procedure); William F. Shughart II & Fred McChesney, Public
Choice Theory and Antitrust Policy, 142 PUB. CHOICE 385 (2010) (antitrust law).
129. See Stigler, supra note 10, at 117.
130. See, e.g., PHILLIPS & ZECHER, supra note 10, at 21-24; Macey, supra note 10, at
915-16, 922.
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increased regulation"' or, in other words, regulatory rents.132 The
most obvious of these beneficiaries are lawyers who receive legal fees
from preparing the required disclosure and securities analysts who, in
the absence of mandatory disclosure rules, would otherwise have to
pay for the same information provided under the disclosure regime. 33
But perhaps less obvious is that these beneficiaries also include large,
well-established firms. Because of their size, these firms are better
able to absorb the increased costs of regulation than are smaller,
upstart firms. The larger firms therefore view regulation as a means of
protecting their market position by relying on regulatory costs to
deter these smaller competitors from entering the market or going
public." The evidence suggests that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act may be
an example of such legislation. The business community split over the
Senate bill that eventually became SOX, reflecting the division
between large and small companies.' 5 The large companies,
represented by the Business Roundtable, supported the Senate bill,
whereas the small companies, represented largely by the Chamber of
131. Central to public choice theory in general is the notion that the public will, as a
general matter, rationally decide not to participate in the political bargain between
lawmakers and the electorate because the relatively high costs of doing so outweigh the
comparatively small benefits. See, e.g., Levine & Forrence, supra note 8, at 189; Levine,
supra note 8, at 272-73. Thus, the theory goes, the size of the political bargaining table is
much smaller than it otherwise would be if the public were involved in the lawmaking
process. See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation Through
Statutory Interpretation: An Interest Group Model, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 223, 230-32 (1986)
(discussing the influence of special interest groups on legislation); Levine, supra note 8, at
273 (noting that "self-regarding regulators can 'sell' policies to special interests in return
for career support"). Moreover, it follows from this "rational apathy" argument that legal
rules themselves will tend to reflect not the interests of the public as a whole but rather the
interests of small, cohesive groups. See Macey, supra note 10, at 920-21.
132. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
133. See PHILLIPS & ZECHER, supra note 10, at 22-23. The observation that individuals
other than securities investors seem to reap most of the benefits of disclosure
requirements can be traced to Stigler's early work, in which he presented evidence
suggesting that the creation of the securities disclosure regime and the establishment of
the SEC had little, if any, effect on the quality and performance of newly issued securities.
See Stigler, supra note 10, at 124. In the early 1980s, Susan Phillips and Richard Zecher
expanded on Stigler's work to offer a public choice interpretation of the securities
disclosure regime, arguing that its principal beneficiaries were, on one hand, lawyers who
received legal fees from preparing the required disclosure and, on the other hand,
securities analysts and others who, in the absence of mandatory disclosure rules, would
otherwise have to pay for the same information provided under the disclosure regime.
PHILLIPS & ZECHER, supra note 10, at 49-51.
134. See, e.g., MCCHESNEY, supra note 8, at 11; Macey, supra note 10, at 914 ("[F]irms
in a particular industry often will welcome new regulatory efforts... because new
regulation can protect existing firms by creating barriers to entry.").
135. See Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack
Corporate Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521, 1564 (2005).
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Commerce, did not."' Empirical research conducted since the
passage of SOX suggests that the interest groups' predictions were
correct: the legislation has placed a disproportionately high burden on
small companies. 13
But under this traditional account, the SEC is not limited to
creating regulatory rents for a fixed universe of constituents that
might benefit from increased regulation. Rather, the bureaucratic
imperialism theory suggests that the SEC will also attempt to attract
new constituents and therefore a new group of potential beneficiaries
of securities regulation and that it will do so by competing with other
agencies over regulatory turf.'"" For example, Jonathan Macey has
highlighted the SEC's attempts to characterize as "securities"
financial instruments that would otherwise be regulated by other
agencies, thereby bringing them within the Commission's
wheelhouse."' Another example of such turf wars comes from the
SEC's battles, prior to the recent financial crisis, with the Comptroller
of the Currency over whether the Commission has "regulatory
authority over commercial banks' activities as broker-dealers."140
Finally, scholars have pointed to examples of SEC turf-grabbing in
the financial regulation debates prior to passage of the Dodd-Frank
Act, including the SEC's request for the authority to regulate credit
default swaps and for a more clearly defined role in supervising the
brokerage arms of investment banks.141
Therefore, the traditional public choice account of SEC behavior
depicts the SEC as facing strong incentives to promulgate rules that
will benefit its current constituents and to engage in bureaucratic
imperialism in an effort to acquire new constituents that can similarly
benefit from such increased regulation. But regardless of whether the
SEC is focusing on its current or future constituents, in this traditional
account, the SEC is focused on increasing regulation. The necessary
136. See id.
137. See, e.g., Carney, supra note 87, at 145; James S. Linck, et al., The Effects and
Unintended Consequences of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act on the Supply and Demand for
Directors, 22 REv. FIN. STUDS. 3287, 3289 (2009) (finding significant increases in the costs
of directors among smaller firms); M. Babajide Wintoki, Corporate Boards and
Regulation: The Effect of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Exchange Listing Requirements
on Firm Value, 13 J. CORP. FIN. 229,231-32 (2007) (finding that smaller firms experienced
a greater decrease in market value with the passage of regulations under SOX requiring
the use of independent directors).
138. See Macey, supra note 10, at 939, 941-43.
139. See id.
140. See id. at 940.
141. See Steven M. Davidoff & David Zaring, Regulation by Deal: The Government's
Response to the Financial Crisis, 61 ADMIN. L. REv. 463,504 (2009).
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implication of this traditional public choice account is that the SEC
will expand its regulatory scope and generate more regulation than
we would expect if the Commission were solely focused on the public
interest.
The problem, however, is that this public choice view of the SEC
is fundamentally at odds with the notion that the Commission would
allow, let alone actively facilitate, the expansion of the private
securities market. Commentators have explicitly acknowledged as
much, 42 and the underlying logic of this conclusion is straightforward
and intuitive: the private securities market falls outside of the SEC's
regulatory scope, and therefore, according to the traditional public
choice account, the SEC gains nothing (and forfeits potential
benefits) when firms take advantage of this unregulated market. It
therefore stands to reason, under this logic, that the SEC will make
efforts to avoid the expansion of the private securities market.
Yet, despite its support from both authority and logic, it is
precisely this public choice implication that creates the puzzle at issue
here: while the traditional public choice account predicts a stagnant, if
not receding, private securities market, we have already seen,
contrary to this prediction, that the SEC has allowed the private
securities market to expand significantly over the past decade and
appears poised to facilitate its continued growth. How can we explain
this conflict between theory and reality? Since little disagreement
exists over the general proposition that the private securities market
has experienced a significant expansion over the past decade, the
solution to the puzzle seems to lie not with a rethinking of the
empirics but with public choice theory itself. In short, the theory
appears to be either incorrect or incomplete.
B. Evaluating the Traditional Public Choice Account of the SEC in
Light of the Financial Crisis
The debate over public choice theory's validity has largely
reflected the debate over the rational actor model more broadly.
While there is little benefit in re-hashing that longstanding debate
here, 4 3 it is worthwhile to examine how the recent financial crisis
might alter that debate, if at all. It is possible that evidence emerging
142. See supra note 14.
143. For an example of that debate within the context of the SEC, compare Macey,
supra note 10, at 921-35 (discussing the SEC's struggle against obsolescence), with Donald
C. Langevoort, The SEC as a Bureaucracy: Public Choice, Institutional Rhetoric, and the
Process of Policy Formulation, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 527, 529-35 (1990) (discussing
the inner-directed behavior of bureaucracies such as the SEC).
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from the financial crisis only emboldens the criticisms of public choice
theory. However, upon further analysis, the evidence from the
financial crisis actually leads to the opposite conclusion: that criticism
of the rational actor model is less compelling when applied in the
political context and particularly when applied to the SEC.
Many, although not all,1" analyses of the financial crisis
hypothesize that sophisticated actors under-estimated, or simply
failed to understand, the risks inherent in very complicated financial
products, thereby effectively questioning the rationality of these
actors and the continued viability of the rational actor model."' Even
some prior defenders of the rational actor model adopted this view,' 4 6
dealing a particularly personal blow to the already embattled
economic theory.
Yet, it is important to point out that not all situations are
necessarily going to test rationality to the same degree. Just because
economic actors may have failed the rationality test (quite
dramatically, to be sure) when assessing the risks of structured
financial products, this does not necessarily mean that they will also
fail the rationality test when assessing the political risk of agency
action. Indeed, political risk seems much less complicated to assess
than the financial risk created by these complex financial products.
Of course, the financial crisis called into question not only the
rationality of economic actors, but also incentive alignment within
firms.147 A similar critique has been leveled at the SEC.148 After all, if
regulators at lower levels of the SEC have different incentives than
regulators at higher levels, then the motivation to maximize political
slack and curry favor with interest groups may not be effectively
144. See, e.g., RAGHURAM G. RAJAN, FAULT LINES 142-44 (2010); Lucian A.
Bebchuk & Holger Spamann, Regulating Bankers' Pay, 98 GEO. L. J. 247, 249-54 (2010)
(proceeding on the assumption that the outsize risk-taking involved in the financial crisis
was due in large part to distorted incentives created by compensation packages that
reward short-term results).
145. See, e.g., Nicola Gennaioli et al., Neglected Risks, Financial Innovation and
Financial Fragility, 104 J. FIN. ECON. 452,454 (2012).
146. Compare, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, A FAILURE OF CAPITALISM: THE CRISIS OF
'08 AND THE DESCENT INTO DEPRESSION 75-82 (2009) (arguing that novel trading
instruments and communication problems between risk analysts and traders combined
with other systemic problems to cause the 2008 financial crisis), with Richard A. Posner,
Rational Choice, Behavioral Economics, and the Law, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1551,1551 (1998)
(critiquing application of behavioral economics to the law and advocating for using
rational-choice economics instead).
147. See, e.g., RAJAN, supra note 144, at 142-44; Bebchuk & Spamann, supra note 144,
at 247.
148. See, e.g., Langevoort, supra note 143, at 528-29.
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transmitted from one level of the organization to another. And to the
extent that the financial crisis provides evidence of incentive
misalignment in firms, it may also provide evidence of such incentive
misalignment at the SEC. The problem, however, is that the analogy
between a firm and an agency like the SEC is imprecise. Whereas
there is little question that management and shareholders in a firm
have different goals at times, it is far less obvious that this is true of
different regulators working for the same agency. Indeed, these
regulators would seem to be similarly situated, united in a desire to
succeed both in their current position and to secure potentially more
lucrative jobs afterward, typically with industry players that were the
target of the Agency's regulatory mandate. A recent report by the
nonprofit Project on Government Oversight shows that the SEC's
"revolving door" is not just theoretical, identifying hundreds of
former SEC employees at all levels of the organization who landed
post-SEC jobs at prestigious firms in the consulting, securities, and
legal industries. 149 In order to secure these jobs, it helps to placate
industry players while still at the Agency, thereby facilitating the
process of regulatory rent creation described previously. And in order
to flourish at these post-SEC jobs, it helps to have grown the
Agency's breadth and depth while employed there, thereby
facilitating bureaucratic imperialism, and in the process ensuring the
continued relevance of the Agency and the value of one's own
expertise as a former bureaucrat.
Thus, it is far from clear that the financial crisis provides
evidence that undermines public choice theory's validity. In fact, the
opposite may be true. Jonathan Macey has argued that when
administrative agencies outlive their relevance (as he claims is the
case with the SEC'), public choice criticisms lose traction."' In
149. PROJECT ON GOV'T OVERSIGHT, REVOLVING REGULATORS: SEC FACES
ETHICS CHALLENGES WITH REVOLVING DOOR 2-3 (May 13, 2011),
http://pogoarchives.org/m/fo/revolving-regulators-20110513.pdf.
150. Macey contends that the threat of obsolescence that the SEC faces comes from
two different sources: advancements in financial technology and increased competition
from alternative sources of securities regulation. See Macey, supra note 10, at 921, 934.
With respect to advancements in financial technology, there are new financial products
that make markets more "complete" by creating new ways to hedge risk. See, e.g., Ronald
J. Gilson & Charles K. Whitehead, Deconstructing Equity: Public Ownership, Agency
Costs, and Complete Capital Markets, 108 COLUM. L. REv. 231, 232-33 (2008). There are
also new entities like hedge funds that arbitrage away discrepancies in prices across
markets. See Macey, supra note 10, at 927-37. In addition to these new technologies that
risk rendering the SEC redundant, the SEC faces an existential threat, Macey argues, from
other regulators who may fill the same role as the SEC and may even do it better. See id.
at 934-36. Macey points to stock exchanges, which impose their own set of rules on
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particular, he argues that when an agency is threatened with
obsolescence, the internal institutional biases that may threaten an
agency's "rationality" (or, in other words, its sensitivity to the effects
of its actions on factors like agency budget, power, and influence)
disappear under a shared goal of survival.152 Similarly, when the
agency's continued existence is jeopardized, the incentive
misalignment that may normally prevent the agency from pursuing its
self-interest diminishes as bureaucrats at all organizational levels
become focused on maintaining the agency's relevance."s5
The reason that the financial crisis may actually bolster public
choice theory's validity is because it arguably left the SEC even more
threatened by obsolescence, to use Macey's term, than it was before.
Although there is no consensus on the causes of the crisis, one view
held by many, and repeated early and often, is that the SEC was
essentially "asleep at the switch" prior to 2008.154 This view only
gained momentum when the Madoff scandal came to light, which
revealed that the Commission had failed to put a stop to the largest
Ponzi scheme in U.S. financial history despite several opportunities to
do so, including through a whistleblower who had spoon-fed the
Agency its case."' Moreover, these doubts about the Commission's
competency soon proved to have real-world effects as the regulatory
overhaul cut back the SEC's authority and power in significant
ways. 5 6
Thus, the fallout from the financial crisis appears to strengthen
Macey's case that the SEC is an agency on the road to obsolescence
and is therefore an agency to which the traditional public choice
criticisms do not apply. Notwithstanding Macey's argument, even if
these criticisms did apply to the SEC, they would still need to be
exchange-traded companies as part of the price of membership. See id. at 934-35.
Securities regulators on the state level may also threaten to topple the SEC from its
privileged perch. See id. at 935-36.
151. See Macey, supra note 10, at 921-27.
152. See id. at 917-18.
153. See id at 921-27.
154. John C. Coffee, Jr., Commentary: Where Was the SEC?, CNNPOLITICS.COM (Dec.
17, 2008), http://www.cnn.com/2008/POLITICS/12/16/coffee.madoff/ (stating that
"considerable evidence suggests [the SEC] was asleep at the switch" with respect to the
Madoff fraud); see also Jill E. Fisch, Top Cop or Regulatory Flop? The SEC at 75, 95 VA.
L. REV. 785, 785-86 (2009) ("The SEC has been the target of relentless criticism ranging
from claims that it mishandled derivatives regulation, oversight of securities firms, and
market risk, to assertions of delays and blunders and possible industry capture at the
Division of Enforcement.").
155. See Coffee, supra note 154.
156. See Davidoff & Zaring, supra note 141, at 504.
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reconciled with the evidence advanced by Stigler and Phillips and
Zecher that public choice theory does in fact do a good job explaining
a considerable amount of otherwise puzzling behavior on the part of
the SEC."' For these reasons, rather than discarding public choice
theory altogether in the face of the puzzle of an expanding private
securities market, it is useful to consider how the traditional public
choice account of SEC action might be incomplete.
C. An Updated Public Choice Account of SEC Behavior
The argument made below is that the private securities market
acts as a substitute for its public counterpart not only in the market
for capital-raising, but also in the market for bureaucratic career
support-the political economy. For this reason, the SEC will
sometimes, although not always, manage to satisfy its constituents'
demands for a particular regulatory outcome by focusing on the
private, rather than the public, securities market. From the SEC's
perspective, this strategy is attractive because reforms to the private
securities market are more likely to fly under the radar of public
scrutiny than reforms of the public market.' 8 The SEC therefore has
greater space in which to pursue its own interests, consistent with the
predictions of public choice theory. In other words, the private
market may offer greater political slack than the public one. When
the risk of losing political slack through reforms of the public market
is particularly high, the SEC will find it preferable to instead focus
reforms on the private market.
This is roughly the state of political play with the dramatic
contraction in the market for initial public offerings over the past
decade. While this phenomenon has received considerable attention,
particularly among industry participants, no consensus exists with
respect to its ultimate causes. The uncertainty regarding the
appropriate regulatory response to the IPO contraction presents a
thorny political problem for the SEC, since any reform of the public
market is likely to attract considerable public scrutiny, particularly if
the attempted reform fails to jumpstart the IPO market. The solution
that the SEC has decided on is to instead expand the private
securities market, which it does by allowing the market to grow
organically and without impediment, and also by raising the
possibility of rules that would formally expand the scope of the
market. This approach allows the Commission to curry favor with
157. See supra notes 125-41 and accompanying text.
158. See infra Part II.C.2.b.
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special interests without running the risk of attracting public scrutiny.
Thus, rather than a puzzle challenging the core of public choice
theory, the expanding private securities market is actually further
evidence of the political economy at work.
1. The Importance of Political Slack in Public Choice Theory
Public choice theory presupposes that agencies are able to
implement policies that benefit special interests at the expense of the
general polity. In some sense, this proposition is quite remarkable in
and of itself. Imagine, for example, a large board meeting where the
chairman of the board is somehow able to ignore the views of all but a
few of the people sitting around the directors' table. As implausible as
this image might appear at first blush, it is actually quite reasonable
when the size of that directors' table grows by several orders of
magnitude to accommodate the views of the members of the polity as
a whole. As a general matter, most of the electorate will find the
information necessary to monitor public officials too expensive to be
worth acquiring, and consequently, public officials will be insulated
(at least most of the time) from influence of the general electorate.'59
In the political economy literature, this space within which regulators
are left to hand out regulatory rents to particular interest groups, free
from the scrutiny of the public, is referred to as political slack.16 0
Thus, regulators cannot pursue their own interests if they are
subjected to political scrutiny, and therefore political slack is a
precondition for the operation of the economic theory of
regulation.'"' Alternatively, one might think of the regulators'
objective function as a constrained maximization problem, where the
constraint is political slack. Just as the firm will maximize its profit
function subject to a budget constraint,162 the regulators will maximize
their own interests, subject to the minimum level of political slack
necessary to execute the rent transfer implicit in this story. Typically,
discussions of public choice theory, particularly those that take place
in the legal literature, simply assume implicitly the presence of slack,
159. See MUELLER, supra note 9, at 384; Levine & Forrence, supra note 8, at 191-94.
160. See, e.g., MUELLER, supra note 9, at 384 ("In the public sector, the bureaucrat
typically exercises his discretion by creating and taking advantage of organizational
slack."); Levine, supra note 8, at 273. See generally Levine & Forrence, supra note 8
(refering to "slack" in the context of political theory).
161. See Levine, supra note 8, at 273 (observing that "[t]he operation of the economic
theory of regulation implicitly relies on the existence of slack").
162. See, e.g., WALTER NICHOLSON & CHRISTOPHER SNYDER, MICROECONOMIC
THEORY: BASIC PRINCIPLES AND EXTENSIONS 127-28 (10th ed. 2010) (displaying a
function that shows how a firm's profits are limited by expenditures).
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and then proceed with examples of policies that reflect regulators
pursuing their own interests.163 Typically, this implicit assumption is
perfectly acceptable for this examination for the simple reason that
most lawmaking takes place in the presence of slack." However,
slack is central to understanding the puzzle of an expanding private
securities market, and therefore it is useful to consider it in some
detail.
In saying that public officials will be insulated from influence of
the general electorate most of the time, the Article allows for the fact
that the level of political slack present at any given time varies
depending on both exogenous and endogenous factors. In other
words, slack can be affected by events that fall both outside and
inside the regulators' control. The determining factor behind this
varying degree of slack is information costs. The less it costs the
general public to be informed on a given issue, the less slack there will
be at any given time. Issues that become so salient that they appear
on every cable news channel will have less slack associated with them
than issues that news outlets either don't pick up at all or that are
marginalized-out of the reach for all but the most diligent follower
of current events. Thus, one would expect periods of significant issue
salience, where the cost of acquiring information and therefore
political slack is low, to coincide with unusual legislative events.16 s
And in fact, this is what the data shows. Stuart Banner, for example,
has demonstrated that most new securities regulation in the United
States has followed stock market crashes, an exogenous event that,
like few others, focuses public scrutiny on an industry and its
regulators.66
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which was enacted following the
accounting scandals of the early 2000s, and the Dodd-Frank Act,
163. See generally William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, The Political Economy
of Fraud on the Market, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 69 (2011) (assuming the existence of political
slack in the analyzing the political economy of the fraud-on-the-market theory); John C.
Coffee, Jr., The Political Economy of Dodd-Frank: Why Financial Reform Tends to Be
Frustrated and Systemic Risk Perpetuated, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 1019 (2012) (assuming the
existence of political slack in discussing the influence of the financial services industry on
legislative reform); Macey, supra note 10 (assuming the existence of slack in examining the
political economy of potentially obsolete administrative agencies); Romano, supra note
135 (assuming the existence of political slack in discussing the politics behind the
enactment of SOX).
164. For a discussion of the conditions that might lead to a reduction of political slack,
see infra notes 190-210 and accompanying text.
165. This prediction is analagous to the one generated by a model developed by David
Baron. See David P. Baron, Persistent Media Bias, 90 J. PUB. ECON. 1, 2 (2006).
166. See Banner, supra note 18, at 850.
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which was enacted in response to the financial crisis of 2008, are
additional data points consistent with Banner's thesis. These two
examples are of particular interest because of the in-depth research
that has been conducted (by Roberta Romano, in the case of SOX,16 7
and Stephen Bainbridge, in the case of Dodd-Frank'") on the origins
of these two pieces of legislation. Although both studies take strong
positions with respect to the value of the resulting legislation
(concluding in each case that both SOX and Dodd-Frank are
inefficient to the extreme), this Article is less interested in these value
judgments and more interested in the public choice principles that are
illustrated by these analyses. Both SOX and Dodd-Frank were passed
during periods when political slack was at a low ebb. SOX was
enacted during not only an election year, but one that followed a rash
of corporate scandals that led to, what was at the time, the largest
bankruptcies in U.S. history. The Dodd-Frank Act was also enacted
in the wake of a serious economic event, this time the most significant
credit contraction and recession since the Great Depression.169 At
least three principles, which are reflected in the public choice
literature, arise from these two studies of real-world lawmaking in the
presence of minimal political slack.
First, when political slack is minimal, public officials may take
positions that are very different from what one would expect, given
their interests. For example, as Professor Romano explains, what
ended up being one of the most controversial (and in the view of the
business community, burdensome) provisions in SOX-the
requirement that the CEO and CFO certify the accuracy of their
company's financial statements'No-was actually proposed by the
Bush Administration itself.17 1 After the Administration included this
certification provision in its ten-point plan for improving corporate
responsibility in the summer of 2002, the Senate included it in the bill
with a slightly different formulation that nevertheless preserved the
substance of Bush's proposal.172 Moreover, the Republicans in the
Senate ended up supporting the Democratic majority's bill, which
167. See Romano, supra note 135, at 1521.
168. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Dodd-Frank: Quack Federal Corporate Governance
Round I, 95 MINN. L. REV. 1779, 1780-M4 (2011).
169. See, e.g., ANDREW Ross SORKIN, Too BIG TO FAIL 59 (2009).
170. 15 U.S.C. § 7241 (2006); 18 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006). In particular, the CEO and CFO
must certify that their company's periodic reports do not contain material misstatements
or omissions and "fairly present" the firm's financial condition and the results of
operations. 15 U.S.C. § 7241(a)(3).
171. See Romano, supra note 135, at 1579.
172. See id. at 1579.
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closely resembled the final legislation. 73 This support came despite
the fact that the Senate bill had been influenced by Democratic policy
advisers, including former SEC Chairman Arthur Leavitt, and was
opposed by the Chamber of Commerce, an important Republican
constituent.174
When public officials take positions that are very different from
what one would expect, as we saw to be the case in SOX, policies that
have little chance of being adopted in the presence of slack all of a
sudden become law when that slack disappears. This is the second
principle that arises from these studies and is reflected in both the
SOX and Dodd-Frank narratives. The SOX example has to do with
the provision of that legislation that prohibits accounting firms from
providing certain nonaudit services (for example, financial
information system design and brokerage services) to the firms that
they audit."' The rationale underlying the ban was that the fees
accounting firms received in exchange for their nonaudit services
compromised their auditor independence by encouraging them to cut
corners or otherwise engage in inappropriate practices in the audit in
order to maintain the nonaudit portion of their clients' business."'
Then-SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt had tried for years to garner the
necessary political support for this sort of ban.'77 Not surprisingly,
however, the accounting profession had been united in its opposition
to a ban on nonaudit services and managed to garner bipartisan
congressional support for their opposition. 17 But in 2002, matters
were entirely different. The accounting profession had suffered a
serious blow with Arthur Andersen's complicity in Enron's financial
fraud. With accounting professionals deemed persona non grata in
Washington, the fact that the accounting industry opposed the ban
when Levitt had worked for passage a few years earlier only served to
strengthen the case in its favor.' 9 Consequently, in a dramatic turn of
events, the same members of Congress who had supported the
accounting industry in its opposition against the ban not two years
earlier switched their allegiances and voted in favor of including the
ban in SOX.
173. Id. at 1567.
174, See id. at 1564-65.
175. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(g) (2006).
176. See Romano, supra note 135, at 1553-54.
177. See id. at 1582.
178. See id. at 1566.
179. See id. at 1582.
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Professor Bainbridge's discussion of the process behind
enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act lends further support to this
principle. As Professor Bainbridge explains, none of the corporate
governance provisions that were included in the Dodd-Frank Act
were novel;18" rather, they had all been proposed in one form or
another over the years.' Yet, with only one exception, none of these
rules had ever come close to becoming law. And the one exception-
the shareholder proxy access rule"'v-had stalled under the weight of
a contentious (and voluminous) notice and comment period at the
SEC.' As with all events that eliminate political slack, however, the
financial crisis changed the political dynamic dramatically. As was the
case with SOX, the interest groups that in normal times would have
prevented these corporate governance reforms from gaining
traction-for example, corporate interests like the Chamber of
Commerce and the Business Roundtable-all of a sudden lost clout
and ceded political ground to other interest groups such as unions,
consumers, and institutional investors.'8 Institutional investors had
for many years advocated and lobbied in favor of these corporate
governance reforms, in particular the "say on pay" rule and the proxy
access rule, with mixed success.'85 It was only when the animal spirits
180. These provisions fall into three main categories: (i) executive compensation,
including a requirement that corporations hold periodic shareholder advisory votes on
executive compensation and rules pertaining to pay clawbacks, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78n-1, 78j-4
(Supp. V. 2011); (ii) shareholder proxy access, including a provision authorizing the SEC
to promulgate rules permitting shareholders to include on the company's proxy statement
their own nominees for the board of directors, id. § 78n(a)(1); and (iii) executive
responsibilities, including a requirement that companies disclose whether the same person
holds both the CEO and Chairman of the Board positions, id. § 78n-2.
181. See Bainbridge, supra note 168, at 1796-97.
182. Pursuant to this provision, the SEC adopted a proxy access rule, which would have
required any public corporation to include in its proxy statement the director nominees of
certain significant shareholders that meet the rule's eligibility requirements. See
Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, 75 Fed. Reg. 56,668, 56,668 (Sept. 16,
2010) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts 200, 232, 240, 294). This rule was subsequently invalidated
by the D.C. Circuit on the ground that the SEC failed to adequately consider the rule's
likely costs. See Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144, 1155 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
183. See Stephen Choi et al., The Power of Proxy Advisers: Myth or Reality, 59 EMORY
L.J. 869, 876 n.48 (2010).
184. Bainbridge, supra note 168, at 1816.
185. Id. at 1807-08. The battle over say on pay had mostly been fought on an ad hoc
basis at corporations themselves. See Randall S. Thomas et al., Dodd-Frank's Say on Pay:
Will It Lead to a Greater Role for Shareholders in Corporate Governance?, 97 CORNELL L.
REV. 1213, 1218-22 (2012) (discussing say-on-pay proposals sponsored by shareholders).
On the proxy access issue, the institutional shareholders really did not have much success
until they persuaded the Second Circuit that the SEC had violated administrative law
principles in deciding that corporations could exclude from the company proxy statement
shareholder proposals asking that the company amend its bylaws to include a proxy access
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of the market pushed these issues onto the public agenda that these
interests were able to prevail. Thus, like the principle in physics
where the mere observation of sub-atomic particles seems to change
their behavior, the public scrutiny of lawmakers changes the way in
which lawmakers behave.186
These two public choice principles that emerge from these
studies of real-world lawmaking lead naturally to the third: everything
else equal, lawmakers will gravitate toward slack. Perhaps the most
vivid illustration of this principle comes from the story behind the
enactment of SOX. Recall that the Republicans in the Senate
supported the Democratic majority's bill, despite the fact that it had
been heavily influenced by Democratic policy advisors and was
vehemently opposed by the Chamber of Commerce. 187 Not only did
the Republicans support the Senate bill, they actually voted to
expedite its passage.' Professor Romano interprets this Republican
support for expedited passage as nothing more than an effort to
remove corporate issues from the public agenda."' In other words,
they wanted to return to a world with slack and do so as quickly as
possible.
The common theme in this discussion of SOX and Dodd-Frank is
that political slack is the norm, not the exception. And the reason
lawmakers prefer the norm is because the disappearance of political
slack leads to conditions in which lawmakers are under increased
scrutiny and have a difficult time pursuing their own interests.
2. Eliminating Political Slack: Exogenous v. Endogenous Triggering
Events
In the case of both SOX and Dodd-Frank, the triggering event
that eliminated political slack was exogenous: it had nothing to do
with any action taken by lawmakers. " Rather, the issues surrounding
provision. See Am. Fed'n of State, Cnty. & Mun. Emps. v. Am. Int'l Grp., 462 F.3d 121,
129 (2d Cir. 2006) [hereinafter AFSCME v. AIG or AFSCME]. That case led the SEC,
under the leadership of Chairman Cox, to eventually propose a proxy access rule and a
rule permitting companies to exclude shareholder nomination bylaw proposals. See Jill E.
Fisch, The Destructive Ambiguity of Federal Proxy Access, 61 EMORY L.J. 435, 445 (2012).
The SEC ultimately adopted the latter rule. See id.
186. This principle is referred to as "particle-wave duality." For an accessible and
entertaining discussion of particle-wave duality, see JOHN GRIBBIN, IN SEARCH OF
SCHRODINGER'S CAT 86-88 (1984).
187. See Romano, supra note 135, at 1564-65.
188. See id. at 1566-67.
189. See id.
190. Of course, this is not to say that the regulators bear no responsibility for the crisis.
To the contrary, there is plenty of blame to go around. The point is simply that the SOX
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each crisis (accounting and corporate governance failures in the case
of SOX and risk-assessment failures in the case Dodd-Frank) came to
light subsequent to very public economic events that could hardly be
missed by even the least informed of the electorate. However, the
theoretical literature, combined with recent events, suggests that slack
can disappear not only because of such highly public events that fall
outside of the lawmaker's control. Rather, slack can also disappear as
a result of regulatory or legislative action itself, what one might call
an "endogenous" triggering event.
Depending on how a particular legislative issue gets elevated
from congressional offices and regulatory backrooms and on to the
public agenda, an endogenous triggering event might be thought to
follow one of two patterns, which this Article refers to as the
"disgruntled negotiator" pattern and the "outraged public" pattern.
The disgruntled negotiator pattern occurs when an interest group
who feels dealt a bad hand in the negotiation of a particular rule or
piece of legislation decides to change negotiating venues. In the
complex negotiation that characterizes the lawmaking process, the
lawmaker must uncover information regarding the goals and
preferences of the various interests... and, given those goals and
preferences, make a decision about what type of regulatory or
legislative package will maximize its own interests. As is commonly
the case, some party will inevitably leave this negotiation feeling
treated unfairly or entitled to a large piece of the pie. By surfacing the
relevant issue with the public (or threatening to do so), this
disgruntled interest group might hope to gain additional support or
bargaining leverage for its position.
In the public choice literature, Professor Mark Roe's description
of the interaction between Delaware and Washington, D.C. in the
creation of corporate law is a useful illustration of how the
disgruntled negotiator type of triggering event might play out.' 92
and Dodd-Frank situations were not ones where regulators took some action that caused a
public outcry. Rather, a confluence of events-a perfect economic storm-led to severe
market dislocations and subsequently heightened public scrutiny.
191. In the negotiation literature, this information is referred to as a party's reservation
value, which is the value placed on the party's best alternative to a negotiated agreement
(or "BATNA"). See, e.g., ROBERT MNOOKIN ET AL., BEYOND WINNING: NEGOTIATING
TO CREATE VALUE IN DEALS AND DISPUTES 19-20 (2000).
192. See, e.g., Mark J. Roe, Delaware's Politics, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2491, 2496 (2005)
(explaining that in the context of the federal-state relationship between Washington and
Delaware, Delaware's failure to appease management and shareholders with Delaware
corporate law may cause a triggering event that places both focus and motivation on
Congress).
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Professor Roe is interested in explaining the features of U.S.
corporate law, which is created largely by the legislature of the state
of Delaware, the state in which the lion's share of U.S. corporations
are incorporated.' The traditional theory is that the states compete
among themselves to attract incorporations, which generate franchise
tax revenue for the states, and the debate has largely focused on
whether this interstate competition creates corporate law that favors
management or shareholders." Professor Roe, by contrast, argues
that the principal competition is not among Delaware and other states
but rather between Delaware and the U.S. Congress." He contends
that Delaware corporate law is not more pro-management (assuming
that that is its natural political tilt) because if the Delaware legislature
were to reach such a one-sided outcome, disgruntled shareholders
would elevate the issue to the public agenda in Washington, thereby
changing the stakes for the managerial interests. 1 96 It is this
disgruntled negotiator type of triggering event combined with the
federal alternative that, for Roe, explains at least in part the content
of corporate law. 9
Of course, there are many ways in which a disgruntled
negotiating party might elevate an issue to the public agenda. In
Delaware, it might be by making noise in Washington. Another
alternative would be to bring the issue to a federal court. This is
essentially the strategy that labor interests adopted in the
controversial case of AFSCME v. AIG,"' which was decided by the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in 2006.'" In
that case, the labor union, AFSCME, had unsuccessfully tried to have
AIG, a company of which it was a shareholder, to include in its proxy
statement a shareholder proposal that called for the adoption of a
"proxy access bylaw amendment."2 " This bylaw amendment would
have required AIG to include in its proxy statement the nominees for
the AIG board of directors submitted by certain shareholders.2 01
193. Id. at 2493.
194. See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, Vigorous Race or Leisurely Walk:
Reconsidering the Competition over Corporate Charters, 112 YALE L.J. 553, 554-55 (2002);
Marcel Kahan & Ehud Kamar, The Myth of State Competition in Corporate Law, 55 STAN.
L. REv. 679, 681 (2002); Roberta Romano, State Competition Debate in Corporate Law, 8
CARDOZO L. REV. 709, 709 (1987).
195. See Mark J. Roe, Delaware's Competition, 117 HARV. L. REV. 588, 591-93 (2003).
196. See id.
197. See id.
198. 462 F.3d 121,124 (2d Cir. 2006).
199. Id. at 121.
200. Id. at 123-24.
201. Id.
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Essentially, this was an attempt at a private work-around for the
failed attempts to persuade the SEC to adopt a rule giving certain
shareholders of public companies access to the corporate ballot."
AIG excluded AFSCME's shareholder proposal from its 2005 proxy
statement after receiving a no-action letter from the SEC's Division
of Corporation Finance, and AFSCME filed suit.203 The Second
Circuit took the position that the SEC's no-action letter authorizing
the exclusion of the proposal represented a change from the SEC's
initial position and that the SEC had never given any reasons for that
change of policy. 2 Consequently, the court deferred to the SEC's
original policy of allowing such proposals, and the decision handed
AFSCME an unexpected win, which paved the way for the SEC's
ultimate adoption of a proxy access rule.205
Thus, a lawmaker's actions themselves might be the triggering
event that eliminates political slack insofar as those actions cause a
disgruntled party to the legislative or regulatory bargain to leave the
negotiation table and elevate the issue to the public agenda.
Alternatively, if the lawmaker's actions are particularly egregious,
they may attract public scrutiny on their own, without the goading of
a disgruntled interest group. An example of the "public outrage" type
of triggering event is the recent scandal involving Bernard Madoff,
which was mentioned previously.20 The SEC came under severe
scrutiny following Madoff's arrest when it was revealed that the
Commission had investigated Madoff at least six times since 1992 and
received numerous tips regarding Madoff's questionable activities
and yet failed to uncover any wrongdoing. 207 Some commentators
speculated that it was this public criticism of the Commission that led
the SEC to undertake its subsequent enforcement action against
202. See Brett McDonnell, Setting Optimal Rules for Shareholders Proxy Access, 43
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 67,73-79 (2011) (providing a helpful overview of the proxy access debate).
203. AFSCME, 462 F.3d at 124.
204. See id. at 128-29.
205. The SEC adopted the proxy access rule in the Fall of 2010. See Facilitating
Shareholder Director Nominations, 75 Fed. Reg. 56,668, 56,668 (Sept. 16, 2010) (codified
at 17 C.F.R. pts 200, 232, 240, 294). However, the rule was subsequently vacated by the
D.C. Circuit because the SEC had, in the court's view, given insufficient consideration to
the economic consequences of the proxy access rule and had ignored certain empirical
data demonstrating that the rule would have negative economic effects. See Bus.
Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144, 1155 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
206. See, e.g., Amir Efrati & Robert Frank, Madoff Set to Plead Guilty to 11 Felonies,
WALL ST. J., Mar. 11, 2009, at Al; see also supra note 155 and accompanying text.
207. Kara Scannell, SEC Botched Inquiries into Madoff Scheme: Inspector General
Cites Inexperienced Staff and Delays; 'A Failure That We Continue to Regret,'WALL ST. J.,
Sept. 3,2009, at C3.
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Goldman Sachs for an unrelated transaction2 08 in an attempt to revive
its tarnished reputation. 09
Thus, to summarize, political slack plays an essential role in
public choice theory. Indeed, a lawmaker's objective function could
be characterized as a constrained maximization problem with political
slack as the constraint. As illustrated through the foregoing examples,
lawmakers will seek out political slack in order to maximize their own
self-interest. While lawmakers will not always have control over the
triggering events that elevate issues to the public agenda and thereby
eliminate political slack, sometimes they will exercise such control.
When they do, they will avoid triggering those events (as in the case
of Delaware's moderate take on corporate law) or will scramble to
reduce the negative fallout from those events (as in the SEC's attempt
to silence its critics in the wake of the Madoff scandal by coming
down hard on Goldman Sachs's allegedly improper role in the
Abacus transaction). These concepts are essential for understanding
the political economy of the expanding private securities market.
3. The SEC's Choice: Reform the Public or Private
Securities Market?
a. Why the Choice at All? The Case of the Declining IPO
Market and the Forces Pushing for Reform
The SEC, when faced with the choice of liberalizing the public
markets or the private markets, may find it advantageous to focus
reform efforts on the private markets. But first, we need to explain
why the SEC faces this choice at all. After all, the traditional public
choice account of SEC action posits that, everything else being equal,
the SEC will continue to cater to its interest groups and grow its
208. The SEC brought the suit against Goldman, alleging that it violated the securities
laws by failing to inform the purchasers of a complex security that Goldman had created
(at the request of the hedge fund manager John Paulson) that Paulson had handpicked the
underlying assets and had taken a short position with respect to the securities. Litigation
Release No. 21489, SEC, The SEC Charges Goldman Sachs with Fraud in Connection
with the Structuring and Marketing of a Synthetic CDO (Apr. 16, 2010), available at
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/1itreleases/2010/lr21489.htm; Complaint at 2-3, SEC v.
Goldman, Sachs & Co. and Fabrice Tourre, 10-CV-3229 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 16, 2010).
Goldman ended up settling the case for $550 million. Susanne Craig & Kara Scannell,
Goldman Settles Its Battle with SEC, WALL ST. J., July 16,2010, at Al.
209. David Lieberman & Matt Krantz, Goldman Sachs Concedes Mistake, Settles SEC
Suit; Investment Bank Agrees to $550M Fine in Mortgage-Securities Case, USA TODAY,
July 16, 2010, at 1B ("Some legal scholars say that it was a much-needed victory for the
SEC, which was on the hot seat after years of appearing to be overwhelmed by the
breadth and complexity of white-collar crimes it had to fight."); Gregory Zuckerman et al.,
U.S. Charges Goldman Sachs with Fraud, WALL ST. J., Apr. 17,2010, at Al.
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bureaucratic reach. The theory does not exactly spell out where and
when, if at all, the SEC will undertake a reform agenda. But it is also
a mainstay of the public choice literature that shocks to a particular
industry can alter an existing political equilibrium, thereby disrupting
the "everything else being equal" assumption, and potentially causing
an agency to change tack, including, for example, by taking up
reforms.2 10
The shock that has disrupted the political equilibrium in the
world of securities regulation is the dramatic decline over the past
decade in the market for IPOs, resulting in what some have referred
to as a "crisis" for capital formation.211 The numbers certainly are
enough to give one pause. From 1991 to 2000, the United States
averaged approximately 530 IPOs per year. 2 12 yet, since 2001, that
average has dwindled to only 126, with only thirty-eight IPOs in 2008
and sixty-one in 2009.213 Furthermore, there is little consensus on the
cause of this IPO decline. Many believe that the decline is the result
of increased regulatory costs as a result of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.2 14
According to these commentators, the increased costs of being public
under SOX deter prospective IPO candidates from pulling the
trigger.215 Others, by contrast, claim that the IPO decline predates the
enactment of SOX and is instead attributable to market changes that
have made it uneconomical for market makers, traders, and analysts
to follow and trade small-cap stocks, which would include recent
IPOs. 2 16 Still others point to culprits like the elimination of the
investment research industry, which resulted from Eliot Spitzer's
efforts to prevent brokers from generating investment research on
companies with which they had banking relationships.2
210. See Macey, Federal Deference, supra note 128, at 265-66.
211. WEILD & KIM, supra note 21, at 3; see also Felix Salmon, Op-Ed., Wall Street's
Dead End, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14,2011, at A27; Whatever Happened to IPOs?, WALL. ST. J.,
Mar. 22, 2011, at A14 (tying fewer IPOs to the costs imposed by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act);
Alan Patricof, It's Official: The IPO Market Is Crippled-And It's Hurting Our Country,
BUS. INSIDER (Jan. 12, 2011, 12:07 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/alan-patricof-
greycroft-ipo-market-2011-1 (attributing the decrease in IPOs to a decrease in
underwriting firms, prohibitive research costs, smaller permitted spreads on trades, and
increasing costs to go public).
212. See WEILD & KIM, supra note 21, at 5.
213. See id. at 3.
214. See, e.g., L. Gordon Crovitz, How Washington Defriended Investors, WALL. ST. J.,
Jan. 10, 2011, at A15; Francesco Bova et al., The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and Exit Strategies of
Private Firms 1 (May 5, 2011) (SSRN, Working Paper), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1730242.
215. Whatever Happened to IPOs?, supra note 211.
216. See WEILD & KIM, supra note 21, at 3-4.
217. Whatever Happened to IPOs?, supra note 211.
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The IPO market decline and the uncertainty as to the causes of
this decline are troubling because of the role this market plays in the
economy. The IPO market is central to economic growth because it
has historically provided companies with an important way to raise
large amounts of capital necessary for investment in research and
development. In addition, as Ron Gilson and Bernard Black first
identified, IPOs provide venture capitalists with a way to exit their
investment in private companies. 2 18 As that exit option closes, it
threatens to discourage the type of financing at the heart of
technological innovation in the United States.
Consider how the declining IPO market disrupts the prevailing
political equilibrium at the SEC. As discussed before, that
equilibrium is dependent upon interests within the securities industry
that benefit from increased disclosure regulation, including securities
analysts and lawyers. But it is also dependent upon larger, more
established companies that welcome higher regulatory costs. These
higher regulatory costs protect the large companies' market position
by erecting real barriers to entry for new, upstart firms with little or
no effect on the large companies' bottom lines.
A dramatically declining IPO market, however, disrupts this
equilibrium by giving the smaller, upstart firms greater bargaining
leverage with the SEC. 219 As the dwindling IPO market causes upstart
firms to become more vocal about the lack of financing and exit and
its effect on American innovation, these firms gain additional
leverage as their complaints threaten to galvanize public support for
their position, thereby eliminating political slack. The upstart firms
become comparatively more powerful than before, and the SEC feels
pressed to help these firms in order to preserve political slack.
Thus, a declining IPO market is likely to lead the SEC to adopt a
deregulatory position. Others have pointed to dwindling political
slack as the cause of other deregulatory episodes, including airline
deregulation in the 1980s.m' But, importantly, when faced with these
deregulatory pressures, the SEC is not limited only to reform of the
IPO market. As discussed previously, the private market is a
substitute for its public counterpart. Like the public securities market,
the private securities market provides a company with capital,
218. Black & Gilson, supra note 62, at 245.
219. One example of this shifting political clout is the SEC's creation of the "Advisory
Committee on Small and Emerging Companies" in 2011. See Letter from Mary Schapiro,
supra note 101.
220. See generally Levine, supra note 8 (applying concept of political slack to airline
deregulation).
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liquidity, and a market price. To be sure, the private securities market
is not a perfect substitute for its public counterpart, but it is a fairly
close one. And the private securities market involves fewer costs,
including those associated with compliance and litigation risk, than
the public market.2 1 Because these two markets are substitutes, even
if imperfect ones, the SEC could respond to a declining IPO market
by either reforming the IPO market or reforming the private
securities market. Thus, the SEC can ease these deregulatory
pressures not only by liberalizing the public market (the IPO market),
but the private one as well. And it appears that the SEC has taken the
latter route.222 To be sure, the SEC has taken some steps to curb the
effects of Sarbanes-Oxley. 223 But it could clearly do more to curb the
costs of that legislation, as scholars22 4 and research groups225 have
221. See supra Part I.A.
222. As mentioned above, the SEC has not stopped the growth of the private securities
market, even when specifically asked by investors, and has undertaken at least one major
action to grow it: shortening the Rule 144 holding limitations. See supra Part I.B. There is
also evidence that the SEC was considering increasing the threshold test for determining
section 12(g) Exchange Act reporting applicability before being preempted by the 2012
JOBS Act. See supra notes 118-120 and accompanying text.
223. See Steven M. Davidoff, With Facebook, Debate Renews over 1.P.O. Regulation,
N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (Jan. 11, 2011, 7:09 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011
/01/11/with-facebook-debate-renews-over-i-p-o-regulation/ (pointing out that the SEC has,
among other things, reduced the regulatory burden on foreign issuers by permitting them
to use international standards in complying with accounting rules). One might also point
out that, in 2005, the SEC undertook a major overhaul of the rules governing public
offerings. See generally Securities Offering Reform, 70 Fed. Reg. 44,722 (Aug. 3, 2005)
(codified as amended in scattered parts of 17 C.F.R.) (modifying "registration,
communications, and offering processes under the Securities Act of 1933"). However, this
reform effort had little, if anything, to do with decreasing the regulatory costs of being a
public company in an effort to jumpstart the IPO market. See id at 44,724-25 (explaining
that the reforms are an extension of a longstanding goal to harmonize the Securities Act
and the Exchange Act and to modernize the securities laws more generally). Rather, its
main purpose was to liberalize the rules that limit communications during the public
offering process. See id. at 44,725. Moreover, the primary beneficiaries of the 2005 public
offering reforms were not small growth firms but rather large, established firms that are
able to fall under the SEC's new category of the "well-known seasoned issuer" and the
more lax rules pertaining to these firms. See id. at 44,726-27 (explaining that the most
flexible communication rules under the reforms would be reserved for this new category
of large issuers).
224. See, e.g., Roberta Romano, Does the Sarbanes-Oxley Act Have a Future?, 26
YALE J. ON REG. 229, 239-51 (2009) (citing, approvingly, commissioned reports
suggesting the need for the SEC to revisit its implementation of Rule 404 of SOX,
including by permitting certain firms to opt out of the rule entirely).
225. See, e.g., COMM. ON CAPITAL MKTS. REGULATION, INTERIM REPORT OF THE
COMMITTEE ON CAPITAL MARKETS REGULATION 1-5 (2006),
http://www.capmktsreg.org/pdfs/11.30Committee-Interim-ReportREV2.pdf; McKINSEY
& Co., SUSTAINING NEW YORK'S AND THE US' GLOBAL FINANCIAL SERVICES
LEADERSHIP, 17-21, 97-100 (2007), http://www.nyc.gov/htmllom/pdf/ny-report-final.pdf;
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pointed out. The reason the SEC has decided to focus its efforts on
the private market makes sense in light of the discussion about
political slack above. In short, "reform" of the private securities
market carries with it less risk of a loss of political slack than reform
of the public IPO market does.
b. Why Private Securities Market Reform Might Be More
Politically Appealing than Public Securities Market Reform
When the SEC is presented with the possibility of reforming the
public or the private securities market, private securities market
reform is probably more appealing from a public choice perspective.
This is because reform of the private securities market involves less of
a risk of a loss in political slack due to endogenous triggering events.
As discussed above, there are basically two different types of
endogenous triggering events, the "disgruntled negotiator" and the
"outraged public." Both types of triggering events will be less likely
with private securities market reform than with the public alternative.
i. Private Securities Market Reform and the
"Disgruntled Negotiator"
Private securities market reform involves less risk of creating a
triggering event through a disgruntled negotiator who elevates an
issue to the public agenda for the simple reason that the private
securities market involves fewer interest groups than the public
securities market. After all, the private securities market is limited to
"sophisticated investors" and "qualified institutional buyers" and
excludes the average retail investor. 226 Furthermore, rules that the
SEC imposes on the valuation of illiquid securities tend to deter
mutual funds and pension funds from investing in the private
securities market and in fact their participation in this market has
been historically quite low. 22 7 For this reason, groups representing
these interests are not present at the bargaining table when it comes
to private securities market reform. With fewer interest groups at the
U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, COMMISSION ON THE REGULATION OF U.S. CAPITAL
MARKETS IN THE 21sT CENTURY: REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 24-28 (2007),
http:lwww.uschamber.com/sites/default/files/reports/0703capmarkets full.pdf; Hal S.
Scott, Op-Ed, Capital Market Regulation Needs an Overhaul, WALL. ST. J., Apr. 20, 2011,
at A13 (noting the need for reform in his capacity as Director of the Committee of Capital
Markets Regulation).
226. See supra notes 35-55 and accompanying text.
227. See Dr. Janet Kiholm Smith et al., The SEC's "Fair Value" Standard for Mutual
Fund Investment in Restricted Shares and Other Illiquid Securities, 6 FORDHAM J. CORP. &
FIN. L. 421,423-24 (2001).
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table, there are fewer voices left to channel potential dismay over
policy decisions into efforts to elevate the relevant issues to the public
agenda.
That interest group formation depends greatly on the venue in
question and may determine political choices is an important theme
in the public choice literature. For example, Professor Roe has made
this observation in the context of the competition between Delaware
and the U.S. Congress over the creation of corporate law.228 Roe
argues that there are fewer interest groups involved in the corporate
lawmaking process in Delaware than in Washington." Whereas
Washington is influenced by everyone from labor to populists,
Delaware's political economy is much simpler and appears to be
dominated largely by managerial and shareholder interests. 230 Given
Delaware's streamlined interest group landscape, managerial and
shareholder groups will typically prefer to keep the corporate
lawmaking process in Delaware.231 Moreover, because of the
difference in interest group formation, public choice theory would
predict that the legislative outcome in Delaware will look very
different from federal legislation on the same issue,232 and indeed it
does. 233
Not only are there differences in interest group formation
between Congress and states but also between Congress and
administrative agencies, like the SEC. This may be because certain
groups have greater influence with administrative agencies. For
example, there is evidence that business interests are particularly
successful at lobbying administrative agencies. Alternatively,
interest group formation may differ between Congress and
administrative agencies simply because of the time lag between the
creation of legislation and the administrative implementation of that
legislation. The political climate can change dramatically during this
time lag. For example, one possible public choice criticism of the
Dodd-Frank Act is that the many rules that must be promulgated in
order to implement the legislation itself will be implemented so long
after the public's interest in financial reform will have waned that
228. See Roe, supra note 192, at 2500-04.
229. See id.
230. See id.
231. See id. at 2504.
232. See id. at 2504-18.
233. See id. at 2518-28.
234. Jason Webb Yackee & Susan Webb Yackee, A Bias Towards Business? Assessing
Interest Group Influence on the U.S. Bureaucracy, 68 J. POL. 128, 133-35 (2006).
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certain interests, like those representing the financial industry, will
have an outsize influence on the rulemaking process.23 5
Thus, what emerges from a synthesis of this literature is that
interest group formation is part of a continuum. There may be fewer
interest groups at the SEC than in Congress, but probably not as few
as in states like Delaware. Not only does interest group formation
depend upon a given lawmaking venue, however, it also depends
upon the policy issue in question. Thus, even within a given venue,
like the SEC, different issues will involve a different array of interest
groups. That lawmakers will gravitate toward areas of greater
political slack also means that they will gravitate toward areas with
fewer interest groups, as is the case with private securities market
reform.
ii. Private Securities Market Reform and the
"Outraged Public"
Not only does private securities market reform exhibit less of a
risk of setting off a disgruntled negotiator triggering event than
reform of its public counterpart, it also carries with it less risk of
igniting the other type of triggering event discussed above: agency
action that in and of itself creates public outrage.
The public is more or less of two minds on financial market
policy. It is either focused on ensuring the competitiveness of the U.S.
markets with those of other countries (possibly at the cost of an
occasional crisis) or it is focused on preventing financial crises (even if
such crisis-prevention might come at the cost of U.S.
competitiveness). These goals are reflected in nearly all finance-
related legislation. This is because the political realities are such that
every piece of securities-related legislation is adopted in the wake of a
crisis and therefore has as one of its goals the prevention of future
crises."' Crisis prevention itself, however, will always entail rules that
are applicable only to U.S. companies. Therefore, legislation that is
intended to prevent future crises lends itself to the concern that U.S.
companies, burdened by the weight of the new rules, will no longer
235. See, e.g., Annie Lowrey, Facing Down the Bankers, N.Y. TIMES, May 31, 2012, at
B1 (reporting on the intense fight among financial interests to influence implementation of
the Dodd-Frank Act and the relative lack of influence wielded by public interest
advocates).
236. See, e.g., Banner, supra note 18, at 850-51.
237. This differential treatment between U.S. and foreign regulators opens up the
possibility of regulatory arbitrage. See Victor Fleischer, Regulatory Arbitrage, 89 TEx. L.
REV. 227, 230 (2010) (explaining the concept of arbitrage in the context of a deal).
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operate as efficiently as their counterparts in other markets where
those rules do not apply. Thus, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which was
undoubtedly crisis-prevention legislation, has given rise to a cottage
industry of studies examining its effect on U.S. competitiveness.23 8
The same has been true of much of the Dodd-Frank Act." And
academic discourse typically must address how a financial or
securities reform proposal affects both goals.240
Since any public securities market reform will require the SEC to
revisit a statute (or more specifically, rules promulgated under a
statute) that created the part of the public market in question, the
SEC will have to navigate, as with Scylla and Charybdis, between the
competitiveness and crisis-prevention positions created by the statute.
This is precisely what IPO market reform requires. For example, if
the SEC concluded that the cause of the IPO market downturn is the
regulatory costs created by certain rules promulgated under the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, then the Commission would need to revisit
those rules in an effort to reduce the regulatory burden that they
impose on companies. However, doing so risks drawing the ire of that
portion of the public that is concerned mainly with crisis prevention.
Of course, the SEC might be able to weather the resulting political
storm, provided that the deregulatory action satisfies the public
cohort that is concerned more with competitiveness issues. For that to
occur, however, the SEC's deregulatory action would actually have to
238. John Thain, Sarbanes-Oxley: Is the Price Too High?, WALL. ST. J., May 27, 2004,
at A21; see also Engel et al., supra note 87, at 142-43 (finding that firms went private in
increasing numbers following passage of SOX); Litvak, supra note 87, at 226-27 (finding
that foreign firms that cross list in the United States and are subject to SOX experienced a
significant decrease in stock price following passage of the legislation as compared to
foreign cross-listed firms that are not subject to SOX); Zhang, supra note 87, at 77 (finding
that the U.S. stock market reacted overwhelmingly negatively to passage of SOX).
239. See, e.g., Financial Regulatory Reform: The International Context: Hearing Before
the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 112th Cong. 16-17 (2011) (discussing the various impacts of
Dodd-Frank on America's international business community); U.S. GOV'T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-11-529, PROPRIETARY TRADING: REGULATORS WILL
NEED MORE COMPREHENSIVE INFORMATION TO FULLY MONITOR COMPLIANCE WITH
NEW RESTRICTIONS WHEN IMPLEMENTED 28 (2011) ("[N]o other industrialized
countries in Europe or around the world plan to enact provisions that parallel the U.S.
restrictions [on proprietary trading]. The foreign regulators we spoke with indicated that if
the U.S. restrictions were implemented in a way that restricts the ability of U.S. banking
entities to serve their clients through market-making, underwriting, or in other ways, that
U.S. banking entities could lose business to their competitors in Europe and elsewhere.").
240. See, e.g., Claire Hill & Richard Painter, Berle's Vision Beyond Shareholder
Interests: Why Investment Bankers Should Have (Some) Personal Liability, 33 SEATTLE U.
L. REV. 1173, 1195-97 (2010) (observing that their proposal to make investment bankers
personally liable for their banks' debt would decrease risk and competitiveness, but that
maybe that is not a drawback).
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be successful. In other words, it would have to result in a
reinvigorated IPO market. If, instead, the SEC were to scale back
SOX-related rules without having any perceptibly positive effect on
the IPO market, then the SEC would fail to satisfy any of the public,
and political slack would deteriorate.
Contrast this scenario with the prospect of reform of the private
securities market. A private market reform agenda involves less risk
of outraging the public for the simple reason that the public has little
interest in the private securities market. After all, the public cannot
directly participate in it. And private securities market reform is
unlikely to raise the hackles of either the crisis-prevention-minded or
the competitiveness-minded public. The SEC can expand the scope of
the private securities market without being accused in the court of
public opinion of scaling back crisis-prevention legislation along the
lines of SOX.24 1 And there is little risk that such reforms would raise
competitiveness issues because, unlike reforming SOX in the hope of
jumpstarting the IPO market, an effort to expand the scope of the
private securities markets is by definition going to achieve its goal of
making privately held capital more accessible to small business.
Thus, the decision to focus reform efforts on the public IPO
market involves a gamble that is simply not present in the case of
private securities market reform: the SEC must be relatively certain
that such efforts will be successful, which means that it must be
relatively certain that the cause of the IPO market decline is SOX.
Otherwise, it risks public outrage. But, as discussed previously, there
is no clear consensus on the causes of the IPO contraction. 242 Thus,
any uncertainty as to the outcome of efforts to reform the public
markets increases the likelihood that the SEC will turn its sights on
the private markets instead.
To summarize, this Article has argued, relying on the example of
the SEC, that contrary to the traditional public choice account,
agencies will sometimes have the incentive to expand the scope of the
unregulated portion of their industry. They will do so, however, only
if such action will avert a situation of diminishing political slack. This
will occur under two conditions: (1) where there has been an
exogenous shock to the industry, like the IPO market decline, that
241. To be sure, it would involve modifying the rules promulgated under the Securities
Act of 1933, but the Securities Act does not exactly have the same salience as crisis
legislation that SOX has.
242. See supra notes 214-17 and accompanying text.
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changes the political dynamic and creates a deregulatory
environment; and (2) where there is considerable uncertainty about
how to reverse the effects of that exogenous shock by reforming the
public markets. Expanding the scope of the private securities market
allows the SEC to maximize political slack by dealing with a relatively
small number of interest groups and avoiding the risk of causing
public outrage in the event that IPO market reform were to end in
failure.
Before transitioning to a discussion of the implications of this
public choice account, it might be useful to briefly consider how this
account might explain the politics surrounding Congress's recent
adoption of the 2012 JOBS Act.243 One of the central features of this
legislation was the increase from 500 to 2,000 of the threshold number
of shareholders of record that a company can have before being
obligated to register as a reporting company under section 12(g) of
the Exchange Act.2 " This legislation represents the first time in
nearly fifty years that Congress (as opposed to the SEC) has
expanded the private securities market.245 And commentators have
questioned the politics surrounding the legislation's adoption, since
the received wisdom that applies to the politics of the SEC is similar
to that of Congress-Congress has an incentive to grow the
regulatory state, particularly in the wake of a crisis. 246 Perhaps most
puzzling of all, however, is not just that the JOBS Act was
deregulatory, but that its deregulatory agenda was rooted in the
expansion of the private securities market rather than the
reformation of the public market through, for example, the scaling
back of SOX.247
243. Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126 Stat. 306 (2012) (codified in scattered sections of 15
U.S.C.A. (West 2009 & Supp. 2012 & Pamphlet 1A Sept. 2012)).
244. See id. § 501, 126 Stat. at 325 (codified at 15 U.S.C.A. § 781(g)(1)(A) (West 2009 &
Supp. 2012 & Pamphlet 1A Sept. 2012)). As a technical matter, the JOBS Act increased
the shareholder of record threshold only with respect to "accredited investors." See id. For
a definition of "accredited investor," see supra note 50.
245. Robert B. Thompson, The JOBS Act: Raising the Threshold for '34 Act
Obligations, CONGLOMERATE (Apr. 24, 2012), http://www.theconglomerate.org/2012/04
/the-jobs-act-raising-the-threshold-for-34-act-obligations.html.
246. See Brett McDonnell, Special Forum: JOBS Act-A Political Puzzle,
CONGLOMERATE (Apr. 24, 2012), http://www.theconglomerate.org/2012/04/special-forum-
jobs-act-a-political-puzzle.htmil. Professor McDonnell offers a number of possible
explanations for the politics underlying the JOBS Act, including that the JOBS Act
represented a response to a sea change in the public's appetite for regulation; that
Congress was simply uninformed; and that the legislation was a type of regulatory stimulus
for the weak U.S. economy. Id.
247. To be sure, the JOBS Act offered some relief from SOX for certain small growth
companies. See JOBS Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, §§ 101-48, 126 Stat. 306, 306-13 (codified
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However, what the foregoing public choice account suggests is
that the JOBS Act represented Congress's response to the same
forces that the SEC has been responding to since the turn of the
twenty-first century and is therefore the culmination of this decade-
long expansion of the private securities market. The logic of this
account should be familiar by now. The dysfunctional IPO market
creates pressure to either reform the public market or expand the
private one. Just as the SEC has done for the past decade, Congress
decided to expand the private securities market with the JOBS Act
because this alternative offers greater political slack and avoids the
uncertainty that accompanies any attempt at diagnosing and solving
the underlying problem with the public market.
III. IMPLICATIONS
A. Implications for the SEC and Securities Law
It was argued in Part II that the expansion of the private
securities market can be viewed as a political strategy on the part of
the SEC to maximize its bureaucratic career support in the face of
uncertainty over how to reform the dysfunctionality of the public
market. This updated public choice account suggests that, as long as
the IPO market remains in the doldrums, there will be strong political
forces pushing for an ever-expanding private securities market. And
because those political forces exclude the public interest, they are
likely to lead the SEC to expand the private securities market beyond
its optimal scope. 248 Three negative implications follow from a private
securities market that is inefficiently large: there will be too little
disclosure, too little liquidity, and too few investment opportunities as
retail investors are crowded out from a market that is reserved
principally for "sophisticated" investors.
1. Disappearing Disclosure
The SEC's favoring of the private market will result in fewer
companies entering the public market (and complying with that
in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.A. (West 2009 & Supp. 2012 & Pamphlet 1A Sept.
2012)). And interestingly, it commissioned the SEC to test whether one popular theory-
the decision to set at one penny the minimum increment at which securities prices are
quoted (also called the "tick size")-might explain the IPO market decline. See id.
§ 106(b), 126 Stat. at 312. But it does not permanently exempt anyone from SOX, and it
does not make any attempt to reform the public market. For this reason, it is more
accurate to view the JOBS Act as primarily intended to deregulate by expanding the
private securities market rather than reforming the public market.
248. See, e.g., Levine, supra note 8, at 273.
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market's mandatory disclosure requirements). In other words, the
political economy of the private securities market may lead to
disappearing disclosure in corporate America. To be sure, whether a
shift from public to private securities markets results in a sub-optimal
amount of disclosure depends on where one comes out in the debates
over the necessity of a mandatory securities disclosure regime and the
ability of private ordering to achieve an efficient level of disclosure.
The theoretical literature that explores this question is notoriously
inconclusive. 24 9 On one side are those who argue that market forces
will compel securities issuers to disclose the optimal amount of
information. 5 0 On the other side, there are those scholars who point
out a number of market failures as evidence of the need for a
mandatory disclosure rule.2 51 While the theoretical literature is
difficult to sort out on its own, the few empirical studies that have
been conducted tend to favor supporters of mandatory disclosure. 5 2
Thus, it would appear that the current state of the literature implies
that as capital-raising activity shifts from the public to the private
securities market, thereby avoiding the mandatory disclosure regime
249. See MICHAEL P. DOOLEY, FUNDAMENTALS OF CORPORATION LAw 395 (1995)
(observing that "the cases for and against mandatory disclosure [are] more or less in
equipose"); FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC
STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAw 314 (1991) ("We are left ... with arguments rather
than proof. And the arguments are themselves inconclusive.").
250. See, e.g., HENRY MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET 169
(1966); Stephen J. Choi & Andrew T. Guzman, Portable Reciprocity: Rethinking the
International Reach of Securities Regulation, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 903, 916 (1998); Frank H.
Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure and the Protection of Investors, 70
VA. L. REV. 669, 687 (1984); Roberta Romano, Empowering Investors: A Market
Approach to Securities Regulation, 107 YALE L.J. 2359, 2361 (1998); Roberta Romano,
The Need for Competition in International Securities Regulation, 2 THEORETICAL
INQUIRIES L. 387,389 (2001).
251. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Market Failure and the Economic Case for a
Mandatory Disclosure System, 70 VA. L. REV. 717, 733-34 (1984) (arguing that mandatory
disclosure "reduces wasteful duplication by establishing a central information
repository"); Zohar Goshen & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Essential Role of Securities
Regulation, 55 DUKE L.J. 711,738-40 (2006).
252. See generally Brian J. Bushee & Christian Leuz, Economic Consequences of SEC
Disclosure Regulation: Evidence from the OTC Bulletin Board, 39 J. ACCr. & ECON. 233
(2005) (finding that rule changes on the over-the-counter bulletin board were correlated
with a drop in the volatility and an increase in the returns of the stocks traded on that
market); Allen Ferrell, Mandatory Disclosure and Stock Returns: Evidence from the Over-
the-Counter Market, 36 J. LEGAL STUD. 213 (2007) (finding similar results with respect to
the imposition of mandatory disclosure on the over-the-counter market in 1964); Michael
Greenstone et al., Mandated Disclosure, Stock Returns, and the 1964 Securities Acts
Amendments, 121 Q. J. ECON. 399 (2006) (also finding that the imposition of mandatory
disclosure was correlated with an increase in the returns of the stocks traded on that
market).
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of the public markets, there will be too little corporate disclosure
from an efficiency perspective.
In the event that an expanding securities market does lead to
such sub-optimal disclosure, the social costs could be significant.
Securities disclosure is thought to be an essential component of
efficient capital allocation, since publicly available information will
affect stock prices, which in turn affects the number of shares a
company must sell to raise a given amount of capital.2 53 Therefore,
less efficient disclosure leads to less efficient stock prices, which in
turn leads to less efficient capital allocation. The bottom line is that
disappearing disclosure may result in less valuable companies and a
less valuable economy.
2. Disappearing Liquidity
Too little disclosure would inevitably lead to too little liquidity as
well. The liquidity of a securities market refers to "the ease (and cost)
of converting one's stock into cash." 254 There are at least two main
social costs associated with less liquid securities markets. The first is
simply the increased cost entailed in liquidating one's investment.2 55 If
a firm decides that it no longer wants to hold a particular security, it is
considerably less costly to sell, for example, the highly liquid share of
Apple, Inc. than it is to sell the comparatively less liquid share of any
of the dozens of private companies just down the road from Apple in
Silicon Valley. This increased transaction cost associated with
disappearing liquidity contributes to the second social cost, which is a
sub-optimal investment portfolio. If it costs investors more to sell
certain securities, then this increased transaction cost may cause
investors to hold investment portfolios that are materially different
from the optimal portfolio that they would hold in a highly liquid
253. See, e.g., Christine A. Botosan & Marlene A. Plumlee, A Re-Examination of
Disclosure Level and the Expected Cost of Equity Capital, 40 J. ACcT. RES. 21, 21 (2002)
(finding a negative relationship between cost of capital and analyst rankings of annual
report disclosures); Christine A. Botosan, Disclosure Level and the Cost of Equity Capital,
72 Accr. REv. 323, 323 (1997) (finding a negative relationship between cost of equity
capital and the extent of disclosure); Jere R. Francis et al., Disclosure Incentives and
Effects on Cost of Capital Around the World, 80 ACCr. REV. 1125, 1125 (2005) (finding
that increased disclosure is negatively correlated with the cost of capital in firms outside of
the United States); Marcel Kahan, Securities Laws and the Social Costs of "Inaccurate"
Stock Prices, 41 DuKE L.J. 977, 988, 1005 (1992). But see Lynn A. Stout, The
Unimportance of Being Efficient: An Economic Analysis of Stock Market Pricing and
Securities Regulation, 87 MICH. L. REv. 613,617-18 (1988).
254. See Kahan, supra note 253, at 1017 n.181.
255. See id. at 1020.
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market.256 For years, commentators have drawn a distinction between
the U.S. securities market, which is highly liquid and deep, and its
European counterparts, which are less so?.7 An expanding private
securities market blurs this distinction.
3. Disappearing Investment Choice: The Crowding-Out of
the Retail Investor
An expanding private securities market would make the U.S.
securities market more like its European counterparts in other ways
as well. Until relatively recently, one of the defining characteristics of
the U.S. corporation has been its dispersed shareholder base.
Unlike European corporations, which are owned largely by banks and
wealthy families, U.S. corporations have historically been owned by
the people themselves.259 As Professor Roe has argued, this sort of
American-style democracy mixed with capitalism emerged out of a
distinctively American psyche and its aversion to centralized power,
be it financial or otherwise .2  To be sure, share ownership in public
corporations in the United States has undergone a significant
consolidation in recent years as managed funds, like Fidelity and
Vanguard, have grown to become the largest shareholders in
corporate America.26' But underlying these funds are still retail
investors: plumbers, teachers, doctors-people of all stripes who,
either through their retirement plans or their non-retirement savings,
invest in these companies.
256. See id.
257. This difference in depth and liquidity of financial markets is primarily what the
"law and finance" literature is trying to explain. See, e.g., Rafael La Porta et al., Law and
Finance, 106 J. POL. ECON. 1113, 1146-51 (1998) (examining the legal rules in forty-nine
countries and finding that securities ownership is more distributed in the United States
and U.S.-influenced nations than in many European nations). As Professor Mark Roe
explains, these studies measure the "depth" of a country's financial markets with reference
to the degree of ownership separation exhibited by that country's firms. Mark J. Roe,
Legal Origins, Politics and Modern Stock Markets, 120 HARV. L. REV. 460, 495 & n.104
(2006). However, Roe cautions, "[s]eparation is only one rough indicator" of depth, and
he identifies stock market capitalization, size of the IPO market, and the number of firms
as other important factors to be weighed. Id. at 495 n.104.
258. See Mark J. Roe, Political Preconditions for Separating Ownership from Corporate
Control, 53 STAN. L. REv. 539, 542, 562 (2000) (drawing a distinction between firms with
dispersed ownership in the United States and the United Kingdom and firms with
concentrated ownership in European countries with social democracies); Roe, supra note
257, at 496 (presenting evidence that the United States has the highest degree of
ownership separation among publicly-traded firms of the twenty-seven countries included
in the sample).
259. See Roe, supra note 257, at 544.
260. See MARK J. ROE, STRONG MANAGERS, WEAK OWNERS 28-33 (1994).
261. See Davis, supra note 98, at 1130-31.
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This is not so in the case of the private securities market, for
these same investment intermediaries, including mutual funds, face
considerable legal limitations on their ability to invest in private
securities.26' Thus, as the private securities market expands, the retail
investor is crowded out, and the model of democratic capitalism that
has defined the American corporate landscape for nearly a century is
upended. This is a concern for several reasons. The first is a personal
finance concern. Financial economics tells us that, with perhaps the
exception of certain investing savants like Warren Buffett, investors
are better off when they can diversify their investments. Through
diversification, investors are able to maximize returns and minimize
risk. However, the private securities market represents an entire class
of investments that are out of reach for the retail investor. And many
of these companies, particularly the innovative growth companies like
an early-stage Groupon or Facebook, simply do not have close
substitutes in the public markets. So, the crowding-out problem that is
exacerbated by the political economy leaves retail investors with less
ability to optimize their personal investment profile.
This personal finance effect of the expanding private securities
market itself leads to increasing financial inequality in the United
States. This effect has a direct and indirect component. The direct
component is simply that retail investors will be excluded from an
increasing number of investments, many of which will be highly
profitable, while wealthy, sophisticated investors retain a piece of the
action. Thus, the crowding-out problem increases wealth inequality
and highlights class differences.
Perhaps even more important, however, is the indirect effect of
the crowding-out problem, which is that it may lead to undesirable
political correctives. The American aversion to financial inequality
and the concentration of financial power in the hands of a relative few
has a powerful influence on the political landscape-so powerful in
fact that, as Professor Roe has argued, it is a significant determinant
of the dispersed shareholder corporation in the first place. But it
can also lead to other, less desirable political outcomes. For example,
Professor Rajan has argued that it was these same political dynamics
that caused American politicians to react to an increasingly unequal
wealth distribution in the United States by maintaining low interest
262. See supra note 227 and accompanying text.
263. See ROE, supra note 260, at 26 (introducing the argument that the public's
"mistrust [of] private large accumulations of power" contributed to the model of dispersed
share ownership in the United States).
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rates, subsidizing mortgages, and encouraging home ownership.264 In
other words, the crowding-out problem simply revitalizes the climate
that some believe played a role in causing the recent financial crisis.
B. Potential Solutions to the Crowding-Out of the Retail Investor?
The forgoing discussion suggests that, should the trend of an
expanding private securities market continue, we are likely to witness
a potentially fundamental transformation in U.S. capital markets as
we grapple with the disappearance of disclosure and liquidity and the
crowding out of the retail investor. Responding to these issues will
require solutions that are adequate to address the magnitude of the
problem. While a full-blown reform proposal falls outside of the
scope of this paper, it is useful to briefly sketch one potential
approach to one potential problem: the crowding-out of the retail
investor. Although one of the other problems (disappearing
disclosure or liquidity) could just as easily have been chosen, this
Article focuses on the crowding-out problem because it seems
potentially the most troublesome. This Article takes a two-prong
approach: a first-order solution (which would likely act as a first-
order solution for the disappearing disclosure and liquidity problems
as well) and a second-order solution, which is more specific to the
crowding-out problem itself.
First-Order Solution. A first-order solution to the crowding out
problem would address the root cause of the problem, which, as
argued here, is a political one. By expanding the private securities
market, the SEC can appease those interests (small firms, in
particular) that demand a solution to the IPO market decline but
without the risk, associated with reform of the IPO market itself, of
elevating the issue to the public agenda and eliminating political
slack. Thus, the first-order solution would aim to alter this calculus so
that the SEC is indifferent as to which market it focuses on for reform
purposes.
One way of creating this indifference is suggested by the political
science literature. Professors Matthew McCubbins and Thomas
Schwartz have argued that Congress typically controls executive
agencies, like the SEC, through what they term "fire-alarm
oversight"-a decentralized system of oversight that relies on
individual citizens and interest groups to smoke out potential areas of
264. See RAJAN,supra note 144, at 38,41-43.
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agency complacency or neglect of legislative goals." Through this
fire-alarm structure, individual citizens and interest groups can
examine administrative decision-making-perhaps by attending
administrative hearings-and can then alert Congress, spurring
Congress to action in the event of a problem.2 66 This theory of fire-
alarm oversight is consistent with public choice theory's view of
political slack. The fire-alarm approach to congressional oversight
provides agencies with substantial political slack, creating space for an
agency to focus on regulatory rent creation until an issue is elevated
(for one of the reasons discussed above) to the public agenda and
political slack is eliminated.
But fire-alarm oversight is not the only possible means of
keeping agencies in check. There is also what McCubbins and
Schwartz refer to as "police-patrol oversight"-a more centralized
system of oversight in which Congress itself, or some group
answerable to the full Congress, keeps active watch over agencies in
an attempt to detect and remedy any objectionable conduct.267
One attempt at a first-order solution to the crowding-out of retail
investors in the private securities market is to adopt a model of SEC
oversight that retains the fire-alarm model but incorporates certain
features of police patrols as well. This hybrid system would attempt to
improve the monitoring of SEC action, not by changing the identity
of the monitors, but by improving the quality of the monitoring.2 8 So,
unlike a pure police-patrol model of congressional oversight, this
hybrid system would not vest oversight responsibility primarily with
Congress. Rather, the general electorate would retain control of this
oversight responsibility, as in the current fire-alarm model. Instead,
the primary goal of the proposed hybrid system would be to lower the
transaction and information costs the public faces in monitoring SEC
activity. As explained above, it is these transaction and information
costs that create the political slack that allows agencies like the SEC
265. See Mathew D. McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz, Congressional Oversight
Overlooked: Police Patrols Versus Fire Alarms, 28 AM. J. POL. SC. 165, 165-66 (1984).
Others have argued that Congress also uses this fire-alarm structure of oversight with
respect to federalism issues. See, e.g., Roe, supra note 192, at 2530.
266. See McCubbins & Schwartz, supra note 265, at 166.
267. See id.
268. This proposal is conceptually similar to the idea of a "regulatory contrarian," as
introduced by Brett McDonnell and Daniel Schwarcz, which they define as "an entity that
is affiliated with, but independent of, a financial regulator with the task of monitoring that
regulator and the regulated marketplace and publicly suggesting new initiatives or
potential structural or personnel changes." Brett McDonnell & Daniel Schwarcz,
Regulatory Contrarians, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1629, 1632-33 (2011).
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to pursue an agenda of regulatory rent creation. And, as this Article
has argued, it is this agenda that actually leads, somewhat counter-
intuitively, to an expanding private securities market and the
crowding-out of the retail investor. Thus, if we could lower these
monitoring costs, we would remove the principal barrier to effective
monitoring that creates political slack and the preconditions for
regulatory rent creation.
The proposed hybrid system would require the creation of a
public interest watchdog group, a bi-partisan entity independent from
the executive and accountable directly to Congress whose sole goal
would be to lower the transaction and information costs that the
public faces in monitoring SEC activity. This public interest watchdog
group would be a populist enterprise, independent of the SEC, with
the goal of explaining, in the simplest terms possible, how SEC action,
or inaction, affects the public. It might highlight, for example, the
implications of an expanding private securities market, explaining
that it leaves retail investors with fewer investment options,
effectively crowding them out. Or it might explain how certain
disclosure rules benefit lawyers and securities analysts. The group's
work product might be analogized to a research analyst's report of
SEC action: a short, accessible analysis of how the SEC is impacting
the public to be published, perhaps online, for public consumption.2 69
To be sure, this proposal raises as many questions as it answers:
Who would be the members of this police patrol? How would they be
chosen? Do we have any indication that this group would not
themselves become captured by interest groups, effectively using
their service on the panel to take their career in new, exciting
directions? The goal here is more exploratory than anything else, and
so these details must be left for another day. But the author does
think it is possible to structure this sort of panel in such a way so as to
269. Recently, Professor Saule Omarova has made a similar proposal to create an
entity, independent from the executive and legislative branches and answerable only to
Congress, whose purpose would be to "introduce the public interest directly into the
regulatory process." Saule T. Omarova, Bankers, Bureaucrats, and Guardians: Toward
Tripartism in Financial Services Regulation, 37 J. CORP. L. 621, 659-60 (2012). Professor
Omarova envisions a group charged with monitoring, more or less, the entire financial
regulatory system in order to ensure the representation of the public interest. See generally
id. (proposing this reform). This Article's proposed public interest watchdog group is, by
contrast, much less ambitious, and for good reason. While the author thinks that the SEC's
political economy may lead to undesirable results, he is less willing than Professor
Omarova to assert a need to correct for public choice distortions in all aspects of our
financial regulatory system, and even if he were so inclined, he is not particularly
optimistic that a small group of people could sufficiently represent the public interest to
achieve that goal.
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minimize interest group capture. For example, the membership on
the panel might not be a full-time job but instead might be a service
rendered on a part-time basis by academics and professionals with a
public-minded interest in the securities markets. To be sure, this type
of panel would be far from a silver bullet for solving the crowding-out
problem, but, if structured correctly, it would at the very least
improve understanding among the electorate about how SEC action,
and inaction, affects their interests.
Second-Order Solution. A second-order solution to the crowding-
out problem addresses not the root cause of the problem-the
political economy-but rather its effects. In this case, the political
economy results in an expanding private securities market that is off
limits to the retail investor.
One potential second-order solution to the crowding-out
problem would be to simply give retail investors greater direct access
to the private securities markets. 270 The problem of course is that the
constraints on investor participation in the private securities market,
including the rules regarding sophistication, are there for a reason: we
do not want less sophisticated investors getting in over their heads
and losing their life savings in ill-advised investments. Indeed, until or
unless we adequately address the problem of disappearing
information and liquidity posed by the expanding private securities
market, it would seem odd to solve the crowding-out problem by
giving retail investors greater access to this market characterized by a
relative paucity of information and liquidity.271
Thus, the only reasonable second-order solution to the crowding-
out problem is one that attempts to give retail investors access to this
market while addressing the information and liquidity issues
presented by the private securities market. To this end, we might
want to think about increasing retail investors' indirect access to the
private securities markets, as opposed to direct access. Most
Americans' stock ownership is indirect anyway, as sixty-two percent
of the U.S. stock market is held indirectly, including through mutual
funds and other intermediaries, with direct ownership accounting for
270. Cf Stephen Choi, Regulating Investors, Not Issuers: A Market-Based Proposal, 88
CALIF. L. REv. 279, 280 (2000) (proposing a regulatory structure that would focus on
investors rather than issuers and that would include relaxed restrictions with respect to
certain types of investors).
271. Note that even under the regulatory structure proposed by Professor Choi, see
supra note 270, at 300-02, unsophisticated retail investors would still face restricted access
to the private securities markets.
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a mere thirty-eight percent.2 72 Moreover, investing in private
securities through mutual funds would allow the retail investor to
have a more diversified portfolio of these securities, thereby reducing
the risks that would result from opening up direct access to the
private securities market.
The principal barrier to realizing this second-order solution to
the crowding-out problem is legal in nature. As mentioned
previously, there are legal constraints that deter mutual funds from
investing in the type of illiquid securities that trade in the private
securities markets. 273 This deterrence effect stems largely from the
manner in which the SEC has advised mutual funds to value these
securities. Because restricted securities are not traded widely, they are
less liquid than a share of a blue-chip public company like IBM, for
example, that trades on the NYSE. Therefore, the market price of
restricted securities is not always reliable, leading to questions of
valuation. With respect to mutual funds, the SEC has taken the
position that these funds should value all securities, including illiquid
ones, at the price that they would command upon a "current sale"-
or, in other words, an immediate liquidation of these securities.274
Furthermore, the SEC requires mutual fund boards to certify the
accuracy of these valuations,275 which exposes these boards and the
funds that insure them to litigation risk in the event that the
valuations turn out to be incorrect.
This regulatory structure might not be a problem if it were not
the case, as some have argued, that a liquidation measure of value for
illiquid securities leaves much to be desired. The main problem is that
mutual funds do not purchase restricted securities with the goal of
immediately trading them, but rather to hold on to them until the
company goes public or sells itself to a larger firm. Instead, by basing
valuation on a short-term horizon, the fund may end up undervaluing
these securities, raising red flags in light of the litigation exposure
created by the certification rules. For these reasons, it should come as
little surprise that whereas mutual funds were active investors in
restricted securities prior to the SEC's guidance on valuation and
272. See Scott, supra note 225.
273. See supra note 227 and accompanying text.
274. Accounting for Investment Securities by Registered Investment Companies,
Investment Company Act, 35 Fed. Reg. 19,986, 19,987 (Dec. 31, 1970); Restricted
Securities, 35 Fed. Reg. 19,989, 19,989 (Dec. 31, 1970); Smith et al., supra note 227, at 423.
275. See 17 C.F.R. § 270.2a-4 (2012); Smith et al., supra note 227, at 423.
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certification in the early 1970s,27 6 it is difficult in recent years to find
mutual funds that devote any substantial investments to restricted
securities. 2 77
Thus, in order to realize the second-order solution of increased
indirect access to private securities markets, it might be advisable for
the SEC to consider allowing funds more latitude in determining and
reporting the values of their illiquid securities. Additionally, the SEC
might consider alternatives to the certification requirements that may
just create too much litigation risk. By doing so, we might succeed in
eliminating some of the legal barriers that seem to deter these funds
from investing widely in the private securities market.
C. Implications Beyond the SEC
Taking one step back, the updated public choice account
developed in this Article suggests that the SEC may have political
reasons to expand the private securities markets, which, as
demonstrated, carries with it potentially costly implications from a
societal perspective. This analysis yields implications beyond the SEC
and the private securities market. Specifically, the updated public
choice account developed in this Article suggests the need for a
greater appreciation of the political elements involved in the theory
of regulatory arbitrage and optimal policy-making generally.
1. Policy Outcome Uncertainty
Much has been written about how policymakers should choose
laws and regulations under conditions of uncertainty. Some argue that
policymakers should choose the policy that maximizes expected
payoff.278 Others prefer the policies that have the lowest uncertainty
as to outcome.2 79 Still others have suggested that policymakers may
actually embrace the uncertainty of a particular policy's potential
outcome through policy experimentation. Under this view,
policymakers should adopt the policy for a trial period to see what
happens and then adjust accordingly depending on the results.2 0
When viewed through a public choice lens, policy outcome
uncertainty may play an entirely different role than the literature
276. For example, prior to 1970, some mutual funds invested, on average, close to
seventy percent of their portfolios in restricted stock. See Smith et al., supra note 227, at
455-56, app. A at 473.
277. See id. at 423, 454-56.
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suggests, causing policymakers to look for alternative ways to satisfy
their constituents without having to wade into the uncertainty
presented by a particular policy path. As this Article has argued, the
uncertainty surrounding the causes of the IPO market decline pushes
the SEC to look for alternative ways of satisfying those interests that
demand increased capital availability. The SEC has found this
alternative in the private securities market.
2. A Political Component to Regulatory Arbitrage?
Regulatory arbitrage has been defined as "the manipulation of
the structure of a deal to take advantage of a gap between the
economic substance of a transaction and its regulatory treatment." 281
In other words, regulatory arbitrage occurs when parties choose to
structure an economic transaction in a particular way to avoid certain
regulatory costs that would attend an alternative structure. Examples
of regulatory arbitrage abound. The so-called "shadow-banking"
industry that attracted attention for its role in the financial crisis of
2008 is but one prominent example. The decision to incorporate a
company in Delaware instead of somewhere else, and the decision to
raise capital in the private instead of the public securities market are
others. The literature on regulatory arbitrage depicts this strategy for
avoiding regulatory costs as almost exclusively the domain of private,
profit-motivated parties with a private sector lawyer acting as a
"transaction-cost" engineer.28 3 To the extent that the government is
involved at all, they are seen as having to be persuaded, through
"sound and reasonable arguments" that a given agency interpretation
is the correct one.28 However, what has been suggested here is that
this traditional analysis of regulatory arbitrage may be incomplete,
and that under certain conditions, politicians and bureaucrats
themselves may actually have an incentive to facilitate certain types
of regulatory arbitrage in the pursuit of their own interests. In these
cases, efforts to minimize regulatory arbitrage will fall short unless
they take into account the political nature of the problem.
281. See Fleischer, supra note 237, at 236.
282. See Zachary J. Gubler, Regulating in the Shadows: Systemic Moral Hazard and the
Problem of the Twenty-First Century Bank Run, 63 ALA. L. REV. 221,235 (2012).
283. For an example, see Fleischer, supra note 237, at 236, 283-84 (depicting the lawyer
as a "regulatory arbitrageur" and characterizing the standard model of regulatory
arbitrage as a game in which the government "moves first" through statutes and
regulations that lawyers and their clients then try to get around through clever planning).
284. See id. at 284.
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CONCLUSION
In 1989, the economist Michael Jensen famously predicted the
"eclipse" of the public corporation. 285 His argument was that the
agency costs arising from the public corporation's separation of
ownership from control and diffuse shareholder base would make the
private firm relatively more attractive. While compelling, there was
reason to doubt Jensen's prediction at the time. In particular, public
choice theory suggested that the SEC would not allow its regulatory
reach to erode as a large swathe of companies either left the regulated
market for its unregulated counterpart or simply avoided entering the
public market altogether. Yet, history appears to have vindicated
Jensen's prediction while we are left having to explain why public
choice theory got it wrong.
This Article has argued that the traditional public choice account
is simply incomplete. Under certain conditions, bureaucrats and
legislators will in fact be willing to permit, or even facilitate, the
expansion of the unregulated portion of their industry if, by doing so,
they are able to avoid the risk of public scrutiny that accompanies
their next best alternative regulatory strategy. Legislators and
bureaucrats will adopt this strategy, in particular, (1) where there has
been an exogenous shock to the industry that changes the political
dynamic and creates a deregulatory environment, and (2) where there
is considerable uncertainty about how to reverse the effects of that
exogenous shock by reforming the public, regulated market. In the
case of the SEC, the exogenous shock has been the dramatic, decade-
long decline in the market for initial public offerings, what some have
referred to as an "IPO crisis." Not only has the market for IPOs
atrophied, but the cause of this abrupt slowdown is uncertain. In this
environment, the SEC is better off allowing its constituents greater
latitude in accessing capital in the private securities market than
attempting to reform the public, regulated market and attracting
public scrutiny, which would prevent the SEC from pursuing its own
agenda.
Thus, contrary to the traditional public choice prediction, this
Article has argued that the SEC will not always have the incentive to
expand its regulatory turf and that it will continue to allow, if not
facilitate, the expanding private securities market, at least as long as
the IPO market remains in its current, dysfunctional state. This
285. Michael C. Jensen, Eclipse of the Public Corporation, HARV. Bus. REV., Sept.-
Oct. 1989, at 61, 61-62.
286. Id.
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prediction raises a concern, however, that as the private securities
market expands relative to its public counterpart, an inefficient
amount of capital-raising will take place in the private securities
market (where disclosure and liquidity are relatively low, and to
which retail investors are barred access). Consequently, there will be
sub-optimal amounts of disclosure and liquidity in U.S. markets.
Perhaps even more troubling, the average retail investor, who is
prevented by both legal and pragmatic constraints from directly
accessing the private securities market, will be "crowded-out" from
investment options as that market expands.
A full-blown policy proposal for dealing with these negative
implications of an expanding private securities market is beyond the
scope of this Article. But as an example of how we might approach
such policy reform, this Article has sketched the outlines of a first-
and second-order solution to what may be the thorniest of the three
problems identified here-the crowding-out of the retail investor
from U.S. securities markets. The Article suggests two approaches to
this problem. The first-order solution would focus on reducing the
information and monitoring costs that create political slack in the first
place and lead the SEC to shy away from IPO market reform. To this
end, the Article suggests establishing a public interest watchdog
group, independent from the executive and answerable to Congress,
whose job would be to monitor the SEC and translate its actions and
inactions into a simple, periodic report that would inform the public
of the impact of SEC decision-making on the retail investor. The
second-order solution would focus on how to provide the average
retail investor with greater access to the private securities market, for
example, by increasing mutual fund participation in that market by
relaxing rules that limit such funds' investment in illiquid securities.
The growth of the private securities market is a remarkable
development in the history of American capitalism. In order to take
stock of this development and evaluate its implications for our
economy, we need a fine-grained understanding of the underlying
causes. These causes may not lie entirely, or even most importantly,
in Silicon Valley or Wall Street, but instead in the back rooms of the
Securities and Exchange Commission.
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